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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Many empirical studies find that a significant part of country’s economic growth can
be explained by how open it is to the rest of the world (Harrison and Rodríguez-
Clare, 2009). International trade, integration initiatives aimed at promoting trade,
migration of people strengthen cross-country linkages and are phenomena that are
increasingly taking place. The volume of the world trade has more than tripled over
the past 20 years. More and more bilateral trade relationships are being established.
The number of non-trading country-pairs has dropped to 18% (see Table 4.3 in
Chapter 4). Along with the increasing trade, a growing number of regional and
preferential trade agreements are being ratified every year in different parts of the
world. A total number of regional trade agreements is currently 278 compared to
twice as few (138) just a decade ago. Several regions have adjusted their migration
policies to lower or eliminate barriers to human capital mobility. An example could
be the expansion of the European Union that granted the right for citizens of the
new entrants to freely move across regional borders. This all raises a variety of
interesting questions that fall into the domain of international economics. At the
same time data availability and data quality have improved greatly. Detailed sets
of panel data are currently available that span a variety of topics for nearly all the
world countries. A large body includes survey data such as the World Bank logistics
performance index or the Consensus Economics data on inflation expectations. The
2growth of data availability and the advancement of statistical and econometric theory
enables the application of modern econometric techniques to empirically investigate
numerous research questions of interest to academics and policy makers.
The recent decade was rich of events in the international arena. The world has
experienced the deepest recession since the World War II. The sluggish recovery that
followed and the prolonged phase of low inflation posed challenges to governments
and central banks of many world economies. The end of 2010 brought the Arab
Spring to the Middle East and North Africa. The turmoil had significant geopolitical
and economic consequences for the region. It strongly hit the region’s tourism sector,
decreased workers’ remittances and created uncertainty among domestic and foreign
investors. Four years later the Maidan Revolution took place in Ukraine which
prompted the signing of the so called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
agreement between the country and the European Union. The trade agreement
came into force on January 1st, 2016. This thesis empirically assesses key aspects
surrounding these events.
Methodologically, a variety of econometric methods have been adopted in this
thesis. In Chapter 2 the results from the theory of stochastic processes are em-
ployed. In particular, the result on the steady state distribution of a reflected geo-
metric Brownian motion is used to model the development of shares of output and
production factors in a given economic area. Chapter 3 employs instrumental vari-
able approach to time series while Chapter 4 deals with the self-selection models for
three-dimensional panel data. Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 rely on well estab-
lished economic relationships - Phillips curves in Chapter 3 and the gravity model
of trade in Chapter 4.
The results of this thesis are policy relevant in several perspectives. First, the
results suggest that governments can stimulate economic integration in the region
via migration policies even if sizable intra-regional trade is absent. Second, cen-
tral banks in advanced economies should focus primarily on monitoring domestic
rather than global economic slack as (core) inflation remains largely a domestic phe-
nomenon. Third, free trade area agreements can have significant indirect effects on
trade flows. In formulating their trade policy stance policy makers in emerging mar-
3kets may therefore consider secondary aspects that arise from the establishment of
closer economic ties with advanced economies. Important relevant aspects include
the improvement in the quality of institutions and the improvement in the quality
of infrastructure.
1.2 Key Questions
1.2.1 Is the Middle East Poorly Integrated?
Chapter 2 develops an integration measure and analyzes the extent of economic inte-
gration in the Middle East. The region was once seen as a medieval great globalized
force. In their discussion of the Golden Age of Islam (8th - 13th centuries), Findlay
and O’Rourke (2007) mention that the exchange in goods, techniques, ideas as well
as movement of people was flourishing. Arab trade routes stretched fromWest Africa
to China and India and long distance travel of final goods and raw materials took
place. However, a geopolitical fragmentation of the Middle East contributed to the
sunset of the Golden Age of Islam and eroded its contribution to science and trade.
It is claimed that the region has never achieved the same nor even close degree of
economic integration. Nowadays the region shows one of the lowest intra-regional
trade in the world. Together with a low number of trade agreements present in the
region, the region is often concluded to be poorly integrated. Yet, with the steady
flow of workers across national borders of the Middle East is this conjecture correct?
To answer this question Chapter 2 develops an integration benchmark that consists
of the steady state production equilibrium characterized by free trade and perfect
mobility of physical and human capital. We apply metrics to measure the distance
between this benchmark and the data and compare three different regions of the
world: European Union, Latin America and Middle East. We find that, despite
large differences in trade patterns, measures of economic integration in 2009 are re-
markably close across regions. For example, we calculate that economic integration
in the Middle East is just 2.4% below that of the European Union.
41.2.2 Do Global Factors Determine Inflation in Advanced
Economies?
A number of recent studies document the prominent role of global factors in do-
mestic inflation developments (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007; Ciccarelli and Mojon,
2010). In Chapter 3 we investigate global dimensions of advanced economy infla-
tion. We estimate open-economy Phillips curves for 19 advanced economies. We
include backward- and forward-looking survey measures of inflation expectations
and augment Phillips curves with global factors including global economic slack,
global inflation and commodity prices. Our results provide little support for the
existence of direct effects of global economic slack on domestic inflation. Moreover,
the results suggest that the importance of global inflation in forecasting domestic
inflation has its roots solely in its ability to capture slow-moving trends in inflation
rates. In the Phillips curve context much the same role is performed by domestic
forward-looking inflation expectations. With the exception of commodity prices,
therefore, our results reveal little reason to include global factors into traditional
reduced form Phillips curves.
1.2.3 What are the Implications of Ukraine’s Trade Policy?
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 has led to the independence of fifteen new
states. Twelve of these, including Ukraine, joined the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) whose goal was to form a common economic space with free movement
of goods, labor and capital. Twenty five years later, CIS countries, and Ukraine in
particular, still face important trade policy choices the implementation of which is
conditional on the quality of governance and infrastructure. The evaluation of these
policy choices gains therefore considerable importance. In Chapter 4 we estimate the
gravity model of trade using alternative estimation approaches that account for zeros
in trade: Heckman (Heckman, 1979), Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (Santos
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and Martin-Pham tobit (Martin and Pham, 2015). We
use an unbalanced panel data set of bilateral export flows among 159 economies over
1997 - 2012 and we control for free trade area and customs union agreements relevant
5for Ukraine. Our empirical results show robust outcomes and advocate importance of
WTO membership, governance and effective distance (corrected for infrastructure).
Using scenario analyses we assess counterfactuals for Ukraine and find, for example,
that improved infrastructure would on average lead to a 22% increase in Ukrainian
exports while improved governance would, ceteris paribus, almost double its trade.
Most of these changes originate from the intensive margin of trade.

Chapter 2
Trade, Factor Mobility and the
Extent of Economic Integration:
Theory and Evidence∗
2.1 Introduction
The literature has demonstrated the benefits of international trade for the growth
experience of open economies (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2009). Particularly,
integration among economies plays an important role in that it increases the long-run
rate of growth. For example, the essential idea of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)
is that integration stimulates the worldwide exploitation of increasing returns to
scale in research and development. Factor mobility is also a powerful instrument
in the allocation of resources and some regions of the world have fewer barriers
to labour mobility than to goods trade. Mundell (1957), in his formal analysis of
the interaction between the international flow of goods and factors, shows that if
factors are internationally mobile, in the extreme form, trade in goods will cease,
which implies that goods trade and factor flows are substitutes. The important
assumptions are those that ensure factor price equalization, including incomplete
specialization. However, Hanson (2010) addresses this conjecture and shows cases
∗Joint with Jean-Marie Viaene. Published as a CESifo Working Paper, 5481 and a Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper, 15-096/VI, 2015.
8of complementarity instead. Hence, the way international factors directly influence
the allocation of resources is an empirical question. Taken together these strands of
the literature point to the need to construct a comprehensive measure of economic
integration among a specific group of countries that goes beyond trade statistics
and includes both goods and factor flows. This chapter develops such a measure
and proposes ways to apply it to different regions of the world.
Let us consider the Middle East, for example. The region comprises a wide
and heterogeneous group of countries. Significant variations in per capita incomes,
different current account positions influenced largely by the possession of natural
resources, highly unequal endowments of production factors contribute to this het-
erogeneity. On the other hand, common religion and common language in most
economies introduce a solid common ground.1 Nowadays, the region shows by far
the lowest intra-regional trade level in the world and a low involvement in the world
trading system. For these reasons, it is often claimed to be a large underachiever in
trade and poorly integrated (World Bank, 2004). However, the steady flow of people
across national borders have significantly contributed to migrants’ remittances and
to output growth thanks to their size and stability (Bugamelli and Paterno, 2011).
Since the effects of increased factor mobility are not universal, the following ques-
tions are often raised: (i) With barriers to trade but labour mobile across countries
how valid is the conjecture that the Middle East is poorly integrated? (ii) How are
integration measures evolving over time and how do they compare to other parts of
the world? The objective of this chapter is to address these issues both formally and
empirically.
Several research institutes compile indicators of globalization for countries and
the world. Recognizing that the dynamics of globalization is a complex matter,
indices give weight to economic, social and political variables (see, for example, the
KOF index). Though useful these indicators assess the extent by which economies
1Moreover, the region was once an example of high and successful economic integration. In their
discussion of the Golden Age of Islam (8th - 13th centuries), Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) mention
that the exchange in goods, techniques, ideas as well as movement of people was flourishing. Arab
trade routes stretched from West Africa to China and India and long distance travel of final goods
and raw materials took place. However, a geopolitical fragmentation of the Middle East contributed
to the sunset of the Golden Age of Islam and eroded its contribution to science and trade. It is
claimed that the region has never achieved the same nor even close degree of economic integration.
9are part of the globalized world at a particular moment in time. However, they do
not indicate how far these economies are in their integration process because the
limits to integration are not specified. Given this, a challenge of this chapter is
to develop an integration benchmark which consists of a steady state equilibrium
characterized by (1) free trade and (2) perfect mobility of both physical and human
capital. Metrics are then developed to measure the distance between this benchmark
and the observed equilibrium characterized by barriers to international trade and
to factor mobility. These metrics allow for comparison of integration over time and
across regions.
There is a vast literature that has contributed to our understanding of the various
dimensions of international labour migration. For example, recent topics include
interest groups and immigration (Facchini et al., 2011), policy interactions between
host and source countries facing skilled-worker migration (Djajić et al., 2012) and
temporary low-skilled migration and welfare (Djajić, 2014). Closer to our work,
Borjas (2001) tests the hypothesis of immigration being "the grease on the wheels" of
the labour market. Likewise, in our model migration leads to greater labour market
efficiency in that the geographic sorting of migrants ensures that the value marginal
products of labour are equalized across countries. Labour migration can also alter
the market for physical capital and aggregate production. Galor and Stark (1990)
show that the probability of return migration results in migrants saving more than
comparable local residents. Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Javorcik et al. (2011) find
that the presence of migrants in the US causes US foreign direct investment in the
migrants’ countries of origin. In contrast, calibrating a dynamic general equilibrium
model to match Canadian data over 1861 - 1913 Wilson (2003) shows that labour
force growth through immigration is responsible for up to three quarters of the rise in
the foreign capital inflows. Similarly, the driving force behind international capital
flows in our framework is the impact of international labour migration on the value
of marginal products of physical capital.
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of output and the stocks of productive
factors within a particular region. Particularly, the variables of interest are country
output shares of regional output and country factor shares of regional factor supplies
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which have been shown to be important both theoretically and empirically (see, for
example, Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Bowen et al., 1987; Viaene and Zilcha,
2002). In this chapter, shares are assumed to behave randomly and their path to be
described by (possibly correlated) reflected geometric Brownian motions with a lower
and upper bound. A random process modeled as a Brownian motion is one approach
out of many, but it has the property of being parsimonious in terms of number of
parameters. A lower bound is justified since nowadays countries are unlikely to
disappear; an upper bound matters as the sum of shares must be one. Given this,
starting from some initial conditions, we derive the steady state distribution of shares
across member countries of a particular region.
Some features of our model have been analyzed before in other frameworks. Par-
ticularly, there has been a rapidly growing literature on the empirical measurement
of economic integration.
Caselli and Feyer (2007) find that, despite large differences in capital-labour ra-
tios, marginal products of capital are close across countries.2 As Lucas (1990) origi-
nally pointed out one of the explanations for this outcome is that poor countries also
have lower total factor productivity (TFP) and lower endowments of factors com-
plementary to physical capital such as human capital. Other studies, e.g. Riezman
et al. (2011), assess how far the world economy is between autarky and free trade
and develop methodologies to answer the question using a global general equilibrium
model. Riezman et al. (2013) discuss metrics of globalization for individual econo-
mies as distance measures between fully integrated and trade restricted equilibria.
Bowen et al. (2011) test empirically the properties of the distribution of outputs and
stocks of productive factors expected to arise between members of a fully integrated
economic area.3
An objective of our empirical section is to apply measures of economic integration
to three groups of countries. Particularly, we contrast the Middle East with the
2Though marginal products of capital (MPK) are generally close, differences are observed across
countries of the Middle East. Implied estimates of MPK are 0.09 in Jordan and Morocco, 0.07 in
Tunisia, 0.05 in Egypt and 0.03 in Algeria (their Table II, last column).
3The evolution of integration over time can also be assessed by focussing on prices of homo-
geneous goods and homogeneous assets assuming that price differentials reflect market frictions
and/or lack of arbitrage. For example, Volosovych (2011) looks at patterns of nominal and real
long-term bonds; Uebele (2013) analyzes wheat prices in Europe and the USA.
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European Union (specifically the 15 original countries or EU-15), which we consider
to be a benchmark of "complete" integration, and with Latin America (specifically
the Latin American Integration Association or ALADI), a control group of countries
at about the same stage of economic development. Empirical tests performed by
Bowen et al. (2011) show that EU integration rose from the 1960s to equal that
of US states by 2000. A comparison to EU integration is also preferred due to
limitations on sourcing data for US state physical capital stocks.4 The other control
group, ALADI, is the largest Latin American trading bloc that includes most of
the sovereign states of Latin America. Their income per capita is similar to the
Middle East (on average if weighted by population) but their degree of integration,
suggested by intra-regional trade and memberships in trade agreements, is seemingly
higher.
Assuming fully integrated goods and factor markets and comparing dynamic
equilibrium paths, we obtain the following results: (i) Using variable elasticity pro-
duction functions, we obtain an equality between output and factor shares of a given
economy. Particularly, each member’s share of an area’s total output will equal its
share of the area’s total stock of physical capital and of human capital; (ii) We derive
the steady state distribution of shares when a lower and an upper bound are imposed
on their evolution. This extends Gabaix (1999) result for the expected distribution
of city shares of a nation’s population; (iii) Using the properties of this distribution,
we derive theoretical shares of each country’s output and factors in the grand total.
This solution is uniquely determined as a function of the number of countries in the
area and of the parameters of the reflected geometric Brownian motion; (iv) Using
the metrics of distance available in the literature, we show that economic integration
in the Middle East is incomplete but in 2009 only 2.4% below that of the European
Union; (v) More generally, we find that despite large differences in trade patterns,
measures of economic integration are remarkably close across regions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines our geographic units
and discusses the respective patterns of trade and factor movements. Section 2.3
4Annual estimates of physical capital stocks per states have to be approximated from estimates
of the aggregate US physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial sectors that comprise
aggregate activity.
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outlines the model and establishes a key theoretical result; in addition, it describes
the data and discusses the empirical method used. Section 2.4 derives the steady
state equilibrium distribution of shares and applies maximum likelihood on available
data. Section 2.5 includes the derivation of the steady state distribution of shares
and the computation of integration measures for each region. Section 2.6 explores
the quantitative implications of our results by computing, for example, how large
human capital flows in the Middle East should be in order to achieve complete
integration. Section 2.7 concludes. Appendix 2.A contains a detailed description of
the data sources and methods.
2.2 Patterns of Trade and Factor Movements
2.2.1 Defining Geographic Units
The Middle East is not a uniquely defined economic region. Although as a rule
religion and geographical borders serve as a guideline for classification, definitions
range from one study to another and are often adopted to meet study specific goals.
There are no standards either available in the definitions used by different organiza-
tions. Table 2.1 provides a summary of countries classified as the Middle East and
North Africa for the three international organizations that are also the main data
sources. Among the four columns we select the definition of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) as it gives a better data coverage for the purpose of our analysis.
The definition includes most of the Arab World countries as the World Bank defines
but augmented by Iran. We exclude Djibouti due to the scarce availability of data.
Our definition of the Middle East therefore, that we also call MENA in shorthand
notation, comprises 19 economies in the region and covers a geographic area that
extends from Iran to the east and Morocco to the west.
EU-15 includes the 15 members of the European Union as of January 1, 1995,
namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
ALADI, a Spanish acronym for the Latin American Integration Association
(Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración), includes the following 14 countries:
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Table 2.1: The definitions of the Middle East.
IMF World Bank World Bank WTO
Country (MENA) (MENA) (Arab World) (Middle East)
Algeria X X X
Bahrain X X X X
Comoros X
Djibouti X X X
Egypt X X X
Iran X X X
Iraq X X X X
Israel X X
Jordan X X X X
Kuwait X X X X
Lebanon X X X X
Libya X X X
Malta X
Mauritania X X
Morocco X X X
Oman X X X X
Qatar X X X X
Saudi Arabia X X X X
Somalia X
Sudan X X
Syria X X X X
Tunisia X X X
United Arab Emirates X X X X
West Bank and Gaza X X
Yemen X X X X
Notes: (i) MENA is an abbreviation for the Middle East and North Africa; (ii) World Bank
definition of the Arab World coincides with the list of member states of the League of Arab
States, a regional organization consisting mainly of Arabic speaking countries; (iii) A number of
subregions exist within the Middle East and North Africa: Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), Mashreq (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria), Gulf
Countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates). Several studies
(Ekanayake and Ledgerwood, 2009; Al-Atrash and Yousef, 2000) documented significant difference
with respect to intra-subregional trade.
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Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
2.2.2 Comparative Review of Selected Indicators
Table 2.2 reviews a number of indicators that are important for our analysis. They
characterize each region’s position in the world economy and give answers to ques-
tions like: In comparison to EU and Latin America does the Middle East really
display a high level of labour mobility? Is it true that it is less involved in the world
economy?5
From Table 2.2 it emerges that international migrants in the Middle East repre-
sent on average 6.9% of the population. This average is lower than in the EU (9.8%)
but it hides a wider cross-country variation. Though the stock of international mi-
grants is only 0.2% in Morocco, it is much larger in the Gulf States (86.8% in Qatar,
84.1% in Kuwait, etc.). Latin American countries have a low base of foreigners in
their societies.
The importance of international migration can be further substantiated by the
bilateral migration matrix compiled by Özden et al. (2011) for the period 1960
- 2000. The systematic publication of the latter has been discontinued till 2010.
Nevertheless, in that year, what we learn from Table 2.2, is that 27.6% of inflows of
international migrants into EU-15 originate from within the region against 49.1% in
Latin America and 30.6% in the Middle East. In contrast, the intra-regional outflow
of nationals is 57% in the EU-15, reflecting the notional free mobility of workers and
persons within the region. These percentages are lower for the other two regions,
mainly due to the attraction of Northern America. Exploiting bilateral mobility
data even further, it turns out that Egypt is the top source country in the Middle
East with 3.7 million nationals living abroad. The top migration corridor within the
region is Egypt having 1 million nationals living in Saudi Arabia. The top migration
corridor into the Middle East includes India having 2.2 million persons being in the
United Arab Emirates. This is little compared to the world’s largest corridor, the
5A more exhaustive description of the data can be found on the EU website
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/), the ALADI website (www.aladi.org) and World Bank (2004).
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Table 2.2: Selected summary statistics.
Statistics EU-15
Latin American
Integration
Association
Middle East
and North
Africa
Stock of migrants
(2005, % of population)
Region(i) 9.8 0.7 6.9
Max 33.6 (Luxembourg) 3.9 (Argentina) 86.8 (Qatar)
Min 3.3 (Finland) 0.1 (Cuba) 0.2 (Morocco)
Inflow of migrants 27.6 49.1 30.6
(2010, % coming from region)
Outflow of nationals 57.0 23.3 32.5
(2010, % heading to region)
Intra-regional trade 64.9 18.8 12.4
(2009, % of total trade)
WTO participation
Members 15 14 12
Observers 0 0 8(ii)
Average participation in regional
trade agreements(iii)
35 8 3
Notes: (i) Euro area average is taken for EU-15, average of developing countries of Latin America
and Carribean is taken for ALADI and Arab World average is taken for MENA; (ii) Observers
are: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Lybia, Syria, Sudan and Yemen; (iii) This corresponds to the
average number of regional trade agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force.
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank and WTO.
12.2 million Mexicans living in the US (World Bank, 2011).
This pattern of international migration stocks is also reflected in the countries’
balance of payments through remittances from abroad. Remittances paid from the
Gulf Sates make the Gulf region one of the most remitting regions in the world (Na-
ufal, 2011). High per capita income countries such as Oman and Kuwait are major
payers of remittances in the region (see Figure 2.1). Their net remittances amount
to about 11% of their GDP in 2009. On the other hand, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco,
Egypt and other lower income and labour abundant economies have been repeated
receivers of remittances throughout the last decade. Importantly, the outflow and
the inflow of remittances in the Middle East has been very close in value till the
Gulf war in 1990, suggesting that remittances were mostly intra-regional. As Naufal
(2011) points out, however, after the Gulf war a systematic replacement of Arab
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workers by cheaper workers from the Indian subcontinent took place, which resulted
in a large share of remittances flowing to Asian countries. Though remittances to
the Middle East economies diminished since then, yet they remain substantial and
illustrate the mutual benefits of labour mobility in the region. The pattern is very
different in Latin America. The majority of countries are net receivers of remit-
tances in 2009 (see Figure 2.1) and although several countries are net payers their
net remittances do not even reach 1% of their GDP.6
Figure 2.1: Net workers’ remittances to GDP in MENA (left) and ALADI (right).
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Notes: (i) In percent; (ii) Year 2009; (iii) Current prices.
Source: Own calculations based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics and World Bank.
It is a commonly held view that trade is a crucial instrument to achieve greater
integration. Regions that demonstrate low trade performance are therefore often
classified as poorly integrated. Intra-regional trade in the Middle East in 2009 is
12.4% (see Table 2.2). This is lower than intra-regional trade in the EU (64.9%)
6Another indicator of factor mobility is the ratio of nominal GNI to GDP. This ratio in 2009
fluctuates between 87.53 for Bahrain and 110.38 for Kuwait. As data suggest almost half of the
countries in the Middle East are net receivers of factor income from abroad with a GNI to GDP ratio
being above 100. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are also countries receiving high flows of investment
income from abroad (see IMF BOPS and World Bank). GNI exceeds GDP also for a number
of labour abundant countries like Jordan and Lebanon. The difference here, however, stems not
from investment income but from sizeable income of nationals employed abroad. In contrast, for
all countries of Latin America GNI never exceeds GDP meaning that countries are net payers of
factor income to the rest of the world: while there is a net inflow of remittances into the region
there is a larger net outflow of investment income. This comes at no surprise as production of
multinationals is widespread in the region while relatively few local firms have subsidiaries abroad.
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and Latin America (18.8%). Ethnic conflicts, protectionism, similar comparative
advantages and better product quality outside the region are reasons frequently
invoked for this low percentage (see, e.g., Romagnoli and Mengoni, 2009). Standard
trade openness indicators, however, remain considerably high even if fuel exports
are excluded (see Table 2.3).7 This is basically due to high imports in the Middle
East that are largely financed by high oil revenues.
Table 2 reveals also that the EU and Latin America are regions that are part of
the global system in that all countries are members of the WTO and are partici-
pants of several regional trade agreements (RTAs). In contrast only 12 Middle East
countries are WTO members while the remaining 8 are observers. A very limited
number of multilateral RTAs exist within the region. Intra-regional trade is being
promoted through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, a customs union comprising
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE), the Pan-Arab Free Trade
Area (PAFTA, a free trade area including all the MENA countries except Iran and
Mauritania) and trade partnerships with Europe (Euro-Mediterranean trade agree-
ments). A significant subset of countries also takes part in the Global System of
Trade Preferences among Developing Countries. Altogether, the average participa-
tion in trade agreements per country is 3 in contrast to the EU average of 35 and
the Latin American average of 8.
2.3 Equality of Output and Factor Shares
Given this background the analysis of this section focuses on how the distribution
of output and stocks of productive factors would look like if an economic area were
characterized by fully integrated goods and factor markets. Particularly, we show
the importance of each member’s share of an area’s total output and its share of
the area’s total stock of physical capital and of human capital, concepts which have
been shown to be important both theoretically and empirically. Particularly, human
774.9% of total MENA exports in 2009 were fuel exports (this percentage is computed using
2009 World Bank data on fuel exports of each MENA economy with the exeption of Iran and
Mauritania, for which a 2010 figure was taken due to unavailability of 2009 data and United Arab
Emirates, for which a 2008 figure was taken).
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Table 2.3: Merchandise trade in MENA.
Country Imports Exports Openness Non-fuel exports Openness
(% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) (excl. fuel exports)
(1) (2) (1)+(2) (3) (1)+(3)
Algeria 27.95 32.15 60.10 0.74 28.69
Bahrain 36.42 57.65 94.07 18.01 54.43
Egypt 23.78 12.20 35.99 8.67 32.46
Iran(2006) 18.29 34.55 52.85 5.95 24.24
Iraq 56.75 64.31 121.07 0.89 57.64
Jordan 56.74 25.41 82.14 25.26 82.00
Kuwait 18.58 47.45 66.03 3.22 21.81
Lebanon 47.46 11.99 59.45 11.93 59.39
Libya(1998) 20.06 24.44 44.49 1.81 21.86
Mauritania(2010) 50.11 55.90 106.01 55.90 106.01
Morocco 36.17 15.46 51.63 15.10 51.27
Oman 38.27 59.00 97.27 12.37 50.64
Qatar 25.35 41.70 67.05 11.34 36.69
Saudi Arabia 25.64 51.61 77.25 6.41 32.05
Sudan 17.74 14.92 32.66 1.18 18.92
Syria(2008) 34.43 29.31 63.74 18.00 52.43
Tunisia 43.88 33.19 77.07 28.66 72.54
United Arab 56.22 75.99 132.20 26.73 82.95
Emirates(2008)
Yemen 34.84 23.74 58.58 1.85 36.69
MENA 32.61 42.72 75.33 11.00 43.61
Notes: (i) The data corresponds to year 2009 if not mentioned otherwise in the superscript of a
country name; (ii) Fuel export comprises a third section of a Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC 3). Thus, fuel export data include not only crude oil, but also coal, natural
gas, non-crude oil and other mineral fuels as SITC 3 defines.
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank World Developments Indicators.
capital is the factor complementary with physical capital, as it is one of Lucas’ major
explanations for his puzzle (Lucas, 1990).
2.3.1 The Economic Framework
We consider an economic area consisting of N countries. Each member is assumed
to produce a single homogenous good by means of a constant return to scale, but
variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production function, proposed by Revankar
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(1971). The function, which is a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function,
reads:
Ynt = γK
1−δρ
nt (Hnt + (ρ− 1)Knt)δρ , (2.1)
where Ynt, Knt, Hnt denote output, physical capital and human capital respectively,
n = 1, ..., N is a country, t = 1, ..., T a time index. Parameter values in (2.1) satisfy
γ > 0, 0 < δ < 1, 0 < δρ < 1. The corresponding share of human capital in
total output is δρ[1 + (ρ− 1)Knt
Hnt
]−1, decreasing in ρ and Knt/Hnt. The elasticity of
substitution σ depends linearly on the physical-to-human capital ratio:
σ = 1 +
ρ− 1
1− δρ
Knt
Hnt
.
When ρ = 1 the VES function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas function with a unitary
elasticity of substitution (σ = 1). We assume σ > 0 which implies that the human-
to-physical capital ratio is such that Hnt
Knt
> 1−ρ
1−δρ . The function spelled out in (2.1) is
therefore different from the constant elasticity of substitution production function
in that the elasticity of substitution implied by the VES production function varies
along the isoquant. With ρ > 1, the latter is generally steeper as Knt/Hnt increases.
Under these assumptions regarding the technology and assuming free trade and
perfect factor mobility within an economic area, an equality between shares arises.
Proposition 1 Given the production function (2.1), if no barriers to the free move-
ment of goods, physical and human capital exist then
Ynt∑N
k=1 Ykt
=
Knt∑N
k=1Kkt
=
Hnt∑N
k=1Hkt
. (2.2)
The shares of output, physical and human capital fully equalize for every country
n = 1, ..., N. Particularly, each member’s share of an area’s total output will equal
its share of the area’s total stock of physical capital and of human capital.
Proof: Marginal products of human capital implied by (2.1) can be expressed as a
function f of human-to-physical capital (x) and as a function g of output-to-physical
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capital (y). In particular, at any date t :
∂Yn
∂Hn
= f
(
Hn
Kn
)
= g
(
Yn
Kn
)
,
where
f (x) = γδρ (x+ ρ− 1)δρ−1
and
g (y) = γ
1
δρ δρy1−
1
δρ .
Functions f and g are strictly decreasing. In particular,
∂f
∂x
= γδρ (δρ− 1) (x+ ρ− 1)δρ−2 < 0
as the first two terms of the product have opposite signs while the last term is always
positive. Namely, γδρ > 0 and δρ − 1 < 0, which follows directly from the domain
over which parameters γ, δ, ρ are defined, and
x+ ρ− 1 > 1− ρ
1− δρδρ > 0,
which follows from the fact that x > 0 and x > 1−ρ
1−δρ . Similarly,
∂g
∂y
= γ
1
δρ δρ
(
1− 1
δρ
)
y−
1
δρ < 0,
which follows again from the definition of the domain of parameters γ, δ, ρ.
Perfect mobility of labour brings about the equalization of value marginal prod-
ucts of human capital across member countries as human capital from the low-return
country flows to the high-return country until efficiency wages fully equalize. With
free trade the price of the single good are similar across countries. Given this and
the strict monotonicity of f and g, equality of marginal products implies equality
of human-to-physical capital ratios and output-to-capital ratios between any two
members of the economic area. Namely, for any pair of countries j and n we obtain
21
the following equality:
Hn
Kn
=
Hj
Kj
and
Yn
Kn
=
Yj
Kj
, (2.3)
which is sufficient to conclude that for any country n within a fully integrated eco-
nomic area the human capital share coincides with that of physical capital and the
physical capital share coincides with that of output. Specifically, employing (2.3)
gives:
Hn∑N
k=1 Hk
=
1∑N
k=1
Hk
Hn
=
1∑N
k=1
Kk
Kn
=
Kn∑N
k=1Kk
and
Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
=
1∑N
k=1
Kk
Kn
=
1∑N
k=1
Yk
Yn
=
Yn∑N
k=1 Yk
,
from where the equal-share relationship (2.2) follows.
This proposition is simply the result of firms’ profit maximization, the equaliza-
tion of value marginal products across countries and the properties of equal ratios.8
It has a number of implications. First, though equal-share relationship (2.2) has
been derived in a frictionless environment, a similar expression obtains in the case
of, for example, TFP differences across locations and barriers to international labour
mobility. While the former are represented in the model by adding country subscript
k to γ, the latter can be captured by a multiplicative wedge ωk. This wedge is a
shorthand for all distortions that potentially affect the marginal return to labour:
income tax, migration quota, pension system, etc. As both parameters enter ex-
pressions for value marginal products directly they impact the allocation of primary
factors across countries. Repeating the steps of the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain:
αnY nt∑N
k=1 αkY kt
=
Knt∑N
k=1Kkt
=
βnHnt∑N
k=1 βkHkt
. (2.4)
where αk = (γ−δρk ωk)
−δρ/(1−δρ) and βk = (γkωk)−1/(1−δρ). Importantly "−" represents
8Capital mobility is redundant to establish the result. With the final good being freely traded a
single commodity price will prevail among member countries. With labour being the mobile factor
of production, we expect it to flow from the low-wage to the high-wage economy until its marginal
product is equalized across countries. With similar goods prices and equal wages, the returns to
physical capital must equal among countries as long as production technologies are similar.
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levels of output and factors that differ from (2.2). Thus, the introduction of TFP
differences and barriers to free mobility though they rescale variables maintain the
equal-share relationship.9
Second, consider for a moment the relative position of a country within a re-
gion by looking at foreign flows of productive factors, mainly human capital, as a
contributor to the growth of a selected country. This aspect can be illustrated in
our framework by considering immigration, an exogenous inflow ∆H > 0 of human
capital into the nth economic unit that originates from outside the region.10 An
inflow of human capital from outside the integrated area (for example, from India)
will, at impact, affect relationship (2.2) for the nth country as follows:
Ynt∑N
k=1 Ykt
=
Knt∑N
k=1Kkt
<
Hnt + ∆H∑N
k=1Hkt + ∆H
Thus, migration into country n increases its share of the total stock of human capital.
Since the increase in the stock of human capital raises the marginal return to physical
capital in country n, incentives arise to increase investment in physical capital. Given
the increase in both stocks of productive factors, country n’s output and share of
total area output increase. These adjustments in output and factor stocks continue
until the equality of shares in (2.2) is restored, but now with country n achieving a
relatively higher level of economic activity than originally.
Having established the equality of output and factor shares in integrated areas,
we now verify its empirical validity. To that end we outline the construction of our
data set and then perform empirical tests.
2.3.2 Data Sources and Methods
Let us denote a share of a variable j ∈ {Y,K,H} by Sjnt. Thus, to compute output
shares SY nt we use:
SY nt =
Ynt∑N
k=1 Ykt
9The last equality of relationship (2.4) requires, however, one of the following two conditions to
hold: either ρ = 1 or αk = αn in any bilateral comparison of marginal products of human capital.
10In contrast, an inflow of migrants from inside the region is endogenous. It responds to cross-
country differences in wages and contributes to equality (2.2).
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Factor shares SKnt and SHnt are computed analogously. Hence, our sample includes
country data on outputs and stocks of physical and human capital. Our data set
is a balanced panel of annual data ranging from 1975 till 2009. This time range
is particularly chosen because the Arab Spring makes the accuracy of data in key
countries like Syria, Egypt and Lybia questionable.
We measure output as gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in international
dollars and valued at constant 2000 prices. The main source of data on output is
Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.0. We use PWT 5.6, PWT 6.2 and the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database of International Monetary Fund (IMF) as ad-
ditional data sources where information is unavailable in PWT 7.0. The data on
the stock of physical capital till 2004 is obtained from the version 6.2 of PWT. Due
to the unavailability of more recent data we use the capital inventory rule on to-
tal real investment to extend the series up to year 2009. The data on investment
is taken from PWT 6.2 and PWT 7.0. Depreciation rates are estimated using a
five-year moving average on depreciation rates implied by the capital inventory rule
on available capital stock and investment data. Just as output, investment and
physical capital are expressed in international dollars and valued at constant 2000
prices. Human capital is measured as total population aged 15 and over that has
at least completed secondary education. The data is obtained from version 1.3 of
the Barro and Lee’s data set on educational attainment. Because the data is only
available on a five-year interval basis and because it exhibits a clear exponential
growth we use cubic splines to interpolate missing observations. The data on hu-
man capital for Lebanon and Oman is estimated using information on population
with secondary and tertiary schooling obtained from their national statistical offices.
A more detailed description of the data and the methods employed for interpolation
and extrapolation is contained in Appendix 2.A.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we further compute the shares of output,
physical and human capital separately for the countries of the Middle East. Figure
2.2 illustrates the distribution of all three sets of shares in 2009 where it is clear
that Iran takes the highest intra-regional share of all the variables. Likewise, sets of
shares are also computed for EU-15 and ALADI and are reproduced in Figures 2.3
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and 2.4.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of output and factor shares in MENA.
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Source: Own calculations based on Penn World Tables 7.0, 6.2, 5.6, IMF IFS and Barro and Lee (2013).
Figure 2.3: Distribution of output and factor shares in EU-15.
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Source: Own calculations based on Penn World Tables 7.0, 6.2, 5.6 and Barro and Lee (2013).
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of output and factor shares in ALADI.
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2.3.3 Tests of Proposition 1
To test whether there is conformity between the ranks of the output and factor
shares we compute Spearman rank correlation coefficients at every time point and
compare them across regions and over time. Contrary to Pearson correlation, rank
correlation not only allows for non linearities to be present in a relationship, but
also considerably lowers the influence of large observations that are typical to our
data.
Table 2.4 reports pairwise Spearman rank correlations computed for the three
regions at different time points. Although reported correlation coefficients are pop-
ulation values and as such are not subject to sampling errors we nevertheless report
bootstrap confidence intervals in the brackets to take into account possible data
measurement errors. The table reveals a significant positive relationship between
any pair of shares. All the coefficients are close to or above 0.7. Thus, a country
with a higher ranked output share tends to also have higher ranked factor shares.
Particularly high, close to unity, coefficients are observed for EU-15 indicating a
nearly perfect rank conformity. Correlations are also relatively stable over time with
some but minor over time variation, which means that a country that takes a certain
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rank position is unlikely to change it quickly.
Table 2.4: Spearman rank correlations.
Output-physical Output-human Physical capital-
capital capital human capital
MENA
1975 0.82 [0.51, 0.95] 0.74 [0.42, 0.89] 0.85 [0.57, 0.96]
1980 0.81 [0.47, 0.95] 0.75 [0.38, 0.90] 0.86 [0.58, 0.97]
1985 0.86 [0.59, 0.97] 0.79 [0.44, 0.94] 0.82 [0.45, 0.96]
1990 0.90 [0.68, 0.97] 0.84 [0.56, 0.96] 0.82 [0.49, 0.95]
1995 0.88 [0.63, 0.97] 0.80 [0.44, 0.96] 0.84 [0.52, 0.95]
2000 0.86 [0.61, 0.96] 0.81 [0.46, 0.96] 0.84 [0.54, 0.96]
2005 0.79 [0.42, 0.96] 0.76 [0.40, 0.93] 0.76 [0.38, 0.94]
2009 0.80 [0.45, 0.96] 0.71 [0.30, 0.92] 0.68 [0.26, 0.91]
ALADI
1975 0.93 [0.71, 1.00] 0.92 [0.71, 0.98] 0.93 [0.69, 0.99]
1980 0.93 [0.72, 1.00] 0.92 [0.63, 1.00] 0.89 [0.58, 1.00]
1985 0.93 [0.71, 1.00] 0.94 [0.69, 1.00] 0.93 [0.69, 1.00]
1990 0.95 [0.72, 1.00] 0.94 [0.72, 1.00] 0.92 [0.66, 1.00]
1995 0.96 [0.84, 1.00] 0.94 [0.76, 1.00] 0.87 [0.57, 0.98]
2000 0.94 [0.75, 1.00] 0.93 [0.71, 1.00] 0.84 [0.49, 0.97]
2005 0.92 [0.67, 1.00] 0.91 [0.67, 0.99] 0.80 [0.39, 0.96]
2009 0.90 [0.65, 1.00] 0.93 [0.70, 1.00] 0.82 [0.42, 0.96]
EU-15
1975 0.97 [0.86, 1.00] 0.97 [0.86, 1.00] 0.99 [0.90, 1.00]
1980 0.99 [0.91, 1.00] 0.97 [0.86, 1.00] 0.98 [0.90, 1.00]
1985 0.99 [0.94, 1.00] 0.99 [0.91, 1.00] 1.00 [0.95, 1.00]
1990 0.99 [0.90, 1.00] 0.97 [0.84, 1.00] 0.97 [0.86, 1.00]
1995 0.99 [0.92, 1.00] 0.97 [0.84, 1.00] 0.98 [0.90, 1.00]
2000 1.00 [0.95, 1.00] 0.98 [0.89, 1.00] 0.99 [0.91, 1.00]
2005 0.99 [0.91, 1.00] 0.96 [0.82, 1.00] 0.98 [0.89, 1.00]
2009 0.99 [0.91, 1.00] 0.95 [0.80, 1.00] 0.96 [0.83, 1.00]
Notes: (i) Although correlation coefficients are population val-
ues and not subject to sampling errors we report bootstrap con-
fidence intervals in the brackets to account for possible data
measurement errors; (ii) 5% significance level; (iii) Number of
bootstrap replications is 5000.
Though Proposition 1 established the equality of shares, its underlying assump-
tions can be used to explain why deviations from equality might be observed in
empirics. First, part of the equality of shares in (2.2) breaks down when the pa-
rameter space includes δρ = 0. With ρ = 0 the VES function degenerates to the
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fixed-coefficient function as a special case: Ynt = γKnt. This specification implies
redundancy of human capital in the nth economy as the employment of human cap-
ital is lower than its endowment Hnt. In this case, the human capital share in (2.2)
no longer equals the other two. Second, in some other economies, human capital
might be instead the constraining factor. It is a simple matter to obtain this out-
come by interchanging the role of Knt and Hnt in (2.2). In this case, the physical
capital share in (2.2) no longer equals the other two. Lastly, the human capital share
in (2.4) differs from the other two when, as shown in footnote 9, the assumptions
ρ = 1 or αk = αn are not verified in any bilateral comparison of marginal products
of labour.
2.4 Steady State Equilibrium Distribution of Shares
2.4.1 Dynamics of Shares
We assume that changes in shares can be the realization of some particular states of
nature. There are numerous reasons why shares could be random. Innovation and
discoveries of natural resources are usually believed to follow a random process once
investments in those activities have been made. Also, upheavals, military conflicts
and natural disasters hit output, stocks of human and physical capital at random.
To characterize such randomness we assume that both output and factor shares
evolve according to a reflected geometric Brownian motion (RGBM) with a drift
parameter µ, volatility σ, lower bound b = minSjnt and upper bound d = maxSjnt.
That is, we assume:
dSjnt
Sjnt
= µdt+ σdBt + dLt − dUt, (2.5)
where Bt is a Wiener process, while Lt and Ut denote non-negative, non-decreasing,
right-continuous processes, guaranteeing reflections every time Sjnt goes below the
lower or above the upper bound (Harrison, 1985). We further impose a normalization
constraint at every time point to ensure share summation to one:
N∑
n=1
Sjnt = 1, t = 1, ..., T. (2.6)
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The evolution of shares spelled out in (2.5) recognizes a link between output and
primary factors in that the process from which shocks to the shares are derived
is common to all. Though the process is similar, the realization of the states of
nature might differ across shares. For example, strikes, technical breakdowns and
political upheavals disrupt the production of goods with minor impacts on the stocks
of production factors. Later in this section, however, we discuss the case of explicitly
modelled correlations. Given this we show:
Proposition 2 If shares evolve according to a reflected Brownian motion given by
(2.5) and its drift and volatility parameters satisfy µ < σ2
2
, there exists a steady state
cumulative distribution of these shares that has the following form:
Fjn∞(S) = P (Sjn∞ ≤ S) = 1− S
2µ
σ2
−1
b
2µ
σ2
−1 − d 2µσ2−1
, S ∈ [b, d]. (2.7)
Proof: Itô lemma applied to logSjnt yields the following expression for (2.5) for
any initial value Sjn0 : log Sjnt = Xnt + Lt − UtXnt = logSjn0 + (µ− σ22 ) t+ σBt (2.8)
A convenient way to model reflections is to use Skorokhod maps that restrict shares
to take values within a given interval. In particular, Lt and Ut are defined as Lt = − inf0≤s≤t ({Xns − log b} ∧ {0})Ut = − inf0≤s≤t ({log d−Xns} ∧ {0})
where inf stands for the infimum of a set so that reflections occur now at log b and
log d. For µ and σ such that µ < σ2
2
there exists a steady state distribution of (2.8).
Zhang and Du (2010) derive the steady state density function of RGBM with two
barriers. The function reads:
fjn∞(S) =
(
1− 2µ
σ2
)
S
2µ
σ2
−2
b
2µ
σ2
−1 − d 2µσ2−1
.
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The corresponding cumulative distribution is then given by (2.7).11
It is clear from (2.7) that though realizations of states of nature differ distribu-
tions of output and factor shares are similar when µ = 0.
An important extension of the proposition is that the steady state distribution
exhibits power law behaviour even when shares of country i and country j and/or
output and factor shares are correlated. The shares must follow RGBM with a sole
lower barrier and a certain pattern of correlations described by the so called skew
symmetry condition: R diagΣ + diagΣ Rᵀ = 2Σ, where Σ is a correlation matrix,
diagΣ is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the variances of each single component
of a multivariate RGBM and R is a reflection matrix that corrects correlations when
one of the single components hits the barrier (see Harrison and Williams, 1987; Dai
and Harrison, 1992).
Given Proposition 2 we are able to focus on the steady state analysis of shares
Snj and therefore omit the time index t. We rank shares in a descending order
attributing the highest rank to the country having the largest share of variable of
interest within the area. Then a country ranked the nth has the nth largest share
within the area or, equivalently, n countries have their shares larger or equal to
the nth largest share. This allows to deduce the following relationship between the
cumulative distribution function and a rank:
P (Sjk ≥ Sjn) = Rjn
N
. (2.9)
Using the cumulative distribution function of shares (2.7) we obtain:
P (Sjk ≥ Sjn) = 1− P (Sjk < Sjn) =
S−βjn
b−β − d−β , (2.10)
11When d =∞ it is a Pareto distribution with the tail index equalling (1− 2µσ2 ). The tail index
can take any positive value. The adding-up constraint (2.6) that we impose further will prevent
shares from being infinite in expectation in case the tail index is smaller than 1.
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where β = 1 − 2µ
σ2
. Using expressions (2.9) and (2.10) we obtain a non-linear rela-
tionship between a rank and a share:
Sjn =
λ1/β
R
1/β
jn
, (2.11)
where λ = N
b−β−d−β .
2.4.2 Empirical Results
Having described the properties of our fully integrated group of economies through
Propositions 1 to 2 we now estimate the long-term relationship derived from the
steady state distribution of shares and show ways to apply maximum likelihood on
available data to estimate µ and σ.
Power Law
Equation (2.11) is a long-run relationship derived from the steady state distribution
of shares, a so called power law. The distribution of ranks Sjn is said to follow a
power law when, for sufficiently large values of the nth ranked variable Sjn, its size
is inversely proportional to a power of its rank. Taking the natural logarithm of
(2.11) yields:
logRjn = log λ− β logSjn, j ∈ {Y,K,H}.
To test whether the power law holds in our sample and whether the exponent of
the power law is close to unity we run simple OLS regressions on a cross-section at
every time point using the log specification above. To correct for a possible small
sample bias we follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) and use adjusted ranks:
log (Rjn − 1/2) = log λ− β logSjn, j ∈ {Y,K,H}. (2.12)
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated slopes of regression (2.12) for the three sets of shares
in the three regions under consideration.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated power law exponents −β.
1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.80
−0.75
−0.70
−0.65
−0.60
−0.55
−0.50
MENA
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
lllll
ll
lllll
ll
llllllll
l
ll
l
l Y K H
1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.80
−0.75
−0.70
−0.65
−0.60
−0.55
−0.50
EU−15
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
lll
l Y K H
1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.80
−0.75
−0.70
−0.65
−0.60
−0.55
−0.50
ALADI
llll
l
llllllll
llllll
llllllll
lll
lllll
l Y K H
Notes: (i) The exponents are significantly different from zero and one at the 5% level. (ii) The coefficient
of determination varies between 0.60 and 0.91.
Estimated exponents are all significantly different from zero at the 5% signifi-
cance level. The data therefore can be indeed well described by power laws. The
estimates, however, are all significantly different from one, which indicates that there
are significant deviations of the share distributions from Zipf’s law. A slight decreas-
ing trend, however, can be observed for most of the exponents, which is a sign that,
although slowly, convergence to Zipf’s law may be taking place.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of RGBM Parameters
The second part of our empirical analysis uses historical series to estimate the pa-
rameters of the reflected geometric Brownian motion. We follow the estimation
approach outlined in Aït-Sahalia (2002) and apply maximum likelihood (ML) on
available data for output and factor shares to estimate the parameters µ and σ.
Let θ = (µ, σ)′ denote a vector of RGBM parameters. A critical step is the
derivation of the conditional density function of normalized RGBM. No such density
in its analytical form exists in the literature. To obtain approximate estimates we
use the density of RGBM with a sole lower barrier derived in Veestraeten (2008). In
this case the density reads:
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P (Sjnt|Sjn,t−∆; θ) = 1σSjnt√2pi∆ exp
[
− (lnSjnt−lnSjn,t−∆−γ1∆)
2
2σ2∆
]
+ 1
σSjnt
√
2pi∆
exp[γ2 (ln b− lnSjn,t−∆)] exp
[
− (lnSjnt+lnSjn,t−∆−2 ln b−γ1∆)
2
2σ2∆
]
− γ2 1Sjnt exp[γ2 (lnSjnt − ln b)]
(
1− Φ
[
lnSjnt+lnSjn,t−∆−2 ln b+γ1∆
σ
√
∆
])
,
where
γ1 = µ− σ22
γ2 =
2
σ2
γ1.
Sjnt denotes as before country’s n share of variable j at time point t and ∆ is a time
step equalling 1 for annual data. ML therefore solves:
θˆ = arg max
θ
`(θ) (2.13)
with the log-likelihood function ` being:
`(θ) =
T∑
t=∆
N∑
n=1
ln[P (Sjnt|Sjn,t−∆; θ)].
Solution to (2.13) can be obtained by various numerical optimization algorithms
such as, for example, the algorithm of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS).
Estimation results of model parameters µ and σ for each set of shares are pre-
sented in Table 2.5.12 From the table it is clear that the volatility of output shares is
the largest. This is partly due to the fact that output is a flow variable and is there-
fore more volatile than the more steady stocks of physical and human capital. In
addition, output volatility in the Middle East is high though expected since MENA
countries have experienced numerous armed conflicts that significantly affected its
output. That volatility in EU is so low can be explained by policy coordination that
is a key to the region. For example, consider the scenario where all N countries in
12We tested this estimation procedure on numerous simulated RGBMs with different µ and σ
to see how estimation using normalized data affects parameter estimates. The method delivers
estimates that are consistent with true parameter values when simulated data is non-normalized.
When simulated RGBM data is normalized and then used as input for estimation, the method still
delivers volatility (but not drift) estimate close to its true value.
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the integrated area put in place a coordinated policy such that the human capital
of each member country increases by a factor λ (λ > 1). Then, using (2.2):
Ynt∑N
k=1 Ykt
=
Knt∑N
k=1Kkt
=
λHnt∑N
k=1 λHkt
=
Hnt∑N
k=1Hkt
.
Table 2.5: Estimates of drift and volatility parameters.
Full sample (1975 - 2009) 1982 - 2009
Region Variable Drift µ Volatility σ Drift µ Volatility σ
MENA
Output shares SY 0.013* 0.117* 0.006 0.106*
Physical capital shares SK 0.005* 0.041* 0.003* 0.028*
Human capital shares SH 0.002 0.037* 0.001 0.030*
EU-15
Output shares SY 0.004* 0.020* 0.003* 0.020*
Physical capital shares SK 0.003* 0.012* 0.002* 0.012*
Human capital shares SH -0.007* 0.023* -0.009* 0.022*
ALADI
Output shares SY 0.001* 0.053* 0.000 0.057*
Physical capital shares SK 0.000 0.024* 0.001 0.021*
Human capital shares SH -0.004* 0.024* -0.006* 0.023*
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
In this situation shares are not modified and the relative position of each country in
the total remains unchanged. It is clear from the above equation that complete har-
monization of policies, expressed in growth factors, makes these shares deterministic
and does not modify the distribution of shares of member countries. Hence, if one
abstracts from random shocks then the volatility of shares would be zero according
to this result. This is a useful benchmark for our empirical analysis.
2.5 Assessing the Degree of Economic Integration
2.5.1 Theoretical Shares
Assume further without loss of generality that country 1 has the largest and country
N has the smallest share of variable j in the area. That is, assume the following:
Sj1 ≥ Sj2 ≥ ... ≥ SjN , j ∈ {Y,K,H}.
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Given the above information, we derive the shares that describe the steady state
equilibrium of an integrated area:
Proposition 3 The steady state distribution of shares is uniquely determined by the
drift parameter µ, volatility σ and the number of countries N. Particularly, shares
are the solution to the following set of equations
Sj1
Sj2
= 2
1
β ,
Sj1
Sj3
= 3
1
β , ...,
Sj1
SjN
= N
1
β . (2.14)
and
Sj1 =
1∑N
n=1 n
− 1
β
(2.15)
Proof. Using (2.11) and taking the ratio of the first share over the second share,
the first share over the third, etc. gives the sequence of ratios in the proposition.
The definition of shares implies also that the same rule holds not only for the shares,
but also for the levels of the variables j ∈ {Y,K,H} :
j1
j2
= 2
1
β ,
j1
j3
= 3
1
β , ...,
j1
jN
= N
1
β .
This in turn together with the definition of shares uniquely determines the share of
the first ranked country or the largest share as a function of the number of countries
only. Namely:
Sj1 =
j1∑N
n=1 jn
= 1∑N
n=1
jn
j1
= 1∑N
n=1 n
− 1
β
.
Shares of remaining countries can be uniquely determined using (2.14).
Proposition 3 gives rise to a number of observations. First, assuming µ = 013
implies β = 1 and Zipf’s law: the share of the first ranked country is twice as large
as the share of the second ranked country, three times as large as the share of the
third country and so on. Also, more importantly, Proposition 3 enables a direct
13µ = 0 follows from the adding-up constraint (2.6). Let gjnt =
Sjnt
Sjn,t−1
− 1 denote the growth
rate of factor j, country n at time point t. Then (2.6) implies
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1gjnt = 0. Taking average
of this expression over time gives Et
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1gjnt =
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1Etgjnt = 0 and because in
our model the drift parameter µ does not vary across countries, this holds only if Etgjnt = 0.
Therefore, the average growth rate must be zero.
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computation of shares for any region under investigation.14 Table 2.6 applies the
proposition to the Middle East and gives the complete distribution of shares for the
region. Likewise Table 2.6 includes the theoretical distribution of shares for our two
control groups, namely the EU-15 (N = 15) and the Latin American Integration
Association (N = 14). It is worth noting that as long as the drift parameter µ
is zero the steady state distribution is not affected by volatility. This allows for
heterogeneity of volatility parameters across variables and across countries. We
denote the steady state distribution as S¯.
Table 2.6: Steady state distribution of shares (µ = 0).
Region Number of Theoretical shares
countries (descending)
Middle East 19 0.282 0.141 0.094 0.070 0.056 0.047
0.040 0.035 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.023
0.022 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016
0.015
Latin American Integration 14 0.308 0.154 0.103 0.077 0.062 0.051
Association 0.044 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.026
0.024 0.022
EU-15 15 0.301 0.151 0.100 0.075 0.060 0.050
0.043 0.038 0.034 0.030 0.027 0.025
0.023 0.022 0.020
14An implicit property of the concept of shares is share summation to one given by (2.6). This
constraint in combination with the result of Proposition 3 can be used to express the barriers of
the RGBM in terms of its drift and volatility parameters. This is useful in identifying the model
parameters when estimating the model and running numerical simulations. To that end, we use
the expression of the first share as implied by (2.11) and set it equal to the first share found in
(2.15) to obtain a non linear relationship between the upper and the lower barrier of RGBM. The
upper barrier is then d = {b−β− N(∑N
n=1 n
− 1
β
)−β }− 1β and is uniquely determined by drift, volatility,
the number of countries and the lower barrier of the process. Because model parameters are time
invariant this expression holds also outside of the steady state and it can be used as an additional
constraint when estimating the parameters of the model. When the upper barrier is infinite, the
lower barrier can be determined by b = N
− 1
β∑N
n=1 n
− 1
β
.
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2.5.2 Measurement of Integration
Given the theory and the empirical analysis of the preceding sections we now assess
and interpret the gap between the limiting distribution of Table 2.6 and the observed
outcomes characterized by the data.
We measure the degree of economic integration by an integration index IE(S¯, St)
which is a transformed Euclidean distance. It is defined as
IE(S¯, St) = e
−E(S¯,St), (2.16)
where E(S¯, St) is the Euclidean distance, measuring the deviation of observed shares
Sjnt from their theoretical counterparts S¯jn found by applying Proposition 3:
E(S¯, St) =
1
3
∑
j=Y,K,H
√√√√ N∑
n=1
(S¯jn − Sjnt)2. (2.17)
The Euclidean metric is always non-negative and takes the value zero when for each
variable j and for each n ranked country, Sjnt = S¯jn: this is the property that arises
under full integration. The lower is the degree of economic integration the greater is
the deviation of the measure from zero, the lower is the value of IE(S¯, St).15 Due to
share summation to one in (2.6) there exists a strictly positive lower bound of the
measure. We estimate this value to be equal to 0.55. This estimate is the minimum
value of (2.16) obtained by taking 10000 bootstrap samples with replications from
the data on an extended set of regions.16 The integration index therefore takes
values within the (0.55, 1] interval, with 1 arising under full integration.17
15To test robustness of our findings to different measures of distance between observed and
theoretical shares we also compute the Theil entropy index. The index is given by T (S¯, St) =
1
3
∑
j=Y,K,H
(∑N
n=1 S¯jn ln
(
S¯jn
Sjnt
))
and respectively the integration measure IT (S¯, St) = e−T (S¯,St).
Like Euclidean integration index the Theil index takes the maximum value of unity when observed
shares coincide with their theoretical counterparts and there exists a positive minimum value due
to share summation to one. The results using this index lead to the same conclusions as the results
of integration index IE .
16The regions we considered were the Middle East, the Pan-Arab Arab Free Trade Area, Latin
American Integration Association, EU-15, Gulf Cooperation Council, Mercosur, Andean Commu-
nity and EU-12 (EU-15 excluding non euro countries).
17Our results are also robust with respect to the transformation we choose to apply to Euclidean
distance. In particular, applying the linear transformation IT (S¯, St) = 1−E(S¯, St) does not change
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Computation of IE(S¯, St) makes use of the following information. Theoretical
shares are found in Table 2.6 while observed shares are ranked in the descending
order so that rank 1 (n = 1) is attributed to the country with the largest share in
the area; rank 2 (n = 2) to the second largest share; etc. Figure 2.6 displays the
computed index values.
Figure 2.6: Integration measure IE.
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The results suggest that since mid 1980s the degree of economic integration is the
highest in the EU-15. However, MENA and ALADI also show high and increasing
index values.18 Surprisingly, the value of the index in the Middle East is comparable
to the EU-15 in 2009, at the height of the financial crisis and just before the Arab
Spring. The values of the indices are, however, all significantly lower than unity
suggesting that although high, integration in MENA and EU-15 is incomplete (see
Figure 2.7).19
the results. This is due to highly concentrated values that the Euclidean measure takes. Given
those values both linear and exponential transformations produce almost identical results.
18Slope estimate of the integration index regression on time is significant at the 5% level for the
period 1980 - 2009.
19We note, however, that our data is non sampled so that the sampling error is zero and our
computed integration index is a true population value for which no confidence intervals exist.
Statistical significance in this case accounts rather for possible data measurement errors.
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Figure 2.7: Integration measure IE with estimated confidence bounds.
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Note: Shaded area denotes a 95% confidence interval obtained by taking 10000 bootstrap samples
with replications.
2.5.3 Regional Comparisons
The computation of the integration index also reveals considerable regional differ-
ences. For example, the results indicate that the degree of integration in MENA is
lower than that in the countries that constitute PAFTA (also known as the Greater
Arab Free Trade Area or GAFTA). PAFTA has a long history in trying to promote
trade and economic cooperation between its members with first initiatives taken as
early as 1950s. While most of the earlier agreements were poorly implemented and
hardly effective, Figure 2.8 suggests that the creation of PAFTA did have a positive
effect.20 Another economic area in the Middle East - GCC - shows instead a lower
integration level. It may be explained by the fact that most of the GCC economies
are major world oil exporters and as such direct most of its trade to non-GCC coun-
tries. Moreover, Saudi Arabia being the only large GCC state, clearly dominates
the total output of the region as well as its physical and human capital. Because
its gains from intra-regional trade are unlikely to be large so would be the gains of
the entire region suggesting that there indeed exists a limit to the degree of inte-
gration in the regions that consist of one large and a few smaller economies. The
20Péridy and Abedini (2008), for example, find a 20% increase in intra-regional trade since the
implementation of the agreement.
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index takes even lower values for the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).21 Just
like GCC Mercosur also includes a clear dominant member - Brazil - that takes the
largest share in regional output, physical and human capital. Andean Community
(Andean),22 another economic area in the South American continent, shows instead
an integration level comparable to that of MENA. These results are in line with
other empirical studies on the effectiveness of trade agreements in Latin America.23
Figure 2.8: Integration measure in different regions of the Middle East and Latin
America.
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
l
l l l
l l l l
l l l l l l l l l l l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l
lPAFTA GCC MENA Mercosur Andean
2.5.4 Re-computed Integration Measures
Our results so far indicate that economic integration in the Middle East is seemingly
comparable to that of EU-15 in 2009. Is it due to economic factors or to any
21Mercosur is a customs union that currently comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
and Venezuela. The agreement is in force since 1988 as notified to WTO.
22Andean Community is a customs union that consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
The union took effect in 1991 for trade in goods and was extended in 2005 to include trade in
services.
23For example, in their gravity analysis of bilateral trade flows between Mercosur countries
García et al. (2013) find positive but very moderate effects of the agreement on intra-Mercosur
trade. In a similar framework Carrillo-Tudela and A Li (2004) investigate the impact of both
Mercosur and Andean agreements on intra-regional trade in several product classifications and
find positive effects in only a very few product classifications with more significant results for
Andean than for Mercosur.
40
distortion in our measurement? These questions raise the issue of robustness of
our results. To that end we use the results on the conformity of ranks implied by
Proposition 1 and then re-compute our indices.
Spearman rank correlations in Section 2.3.3 indicate that the conformity of ranks
is not perfect, i.e. the equal-share relationship, that should hold in our fully inte-
grated benchmark, does not always hold in the data. We did not take this into
account while computing the deviations from the fully integrated benchmark in our
index (2.17). We essentially missed to assure that the country that ranks the nth in
the observed distribution of shares is the same across all types of shares. There are
three ways to re-compute index (2.17) so that this distortion was accounted for and
the deviations from the fully integrated benchmark were quantified more accurately.
We can compute the index based on the observed ranking of countries at a given year
by: (i) output shares; (ii) physical capital shares; (iii) human capital shares. For
example, let us focus on the latter and consider the case of the Iranian Revolution
in 1979.
A glance at the data reveals that the Iranian Revolution caused a severe decline
in the output share of Iran. The share dropped to 17.6% in 1980 making Iran the
second ranked country after Saudi Arabia. The Iran-Iraq war furthered the decline.
Nevertheless, Iran still ranked the first in its factor shares with the physical capital
share equalling 44.6% and the human capital share equalling 29.8%. The equal-share
relationship is clearly violated in this case and penalties for such violations must
be introduced in (2.17) to accurately quantify deviations from the fully integrated
benchmark. Thus, Iran is ranked the first in 1980 for both human (H ) and physical
capital (K ). To preserve the equality of shares, Iranian output (Y ) is positioned the
first though it is not, which introduces a large gap between S¯1 and SY 1,1980. E(S¯, St)
increases and the integration measure decreases as a result of this correction. The
more a country violates the equal share relationship the larger are the deviations
and the smaller is the value of the integration index. Likewise the revision of the
integration index can be performed using observed output and physical capital shares
instead.
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Figure 2.9: Integration measure re-computed.
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Note: The computation of the integration measure is performed attributing the nth largest
theoretical share to the country with the nth largest human capital share at a given year.
The results are similar when computation is performed based on physical capital and
output shares.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the re-computed integration index. Output and physical
capital based computations yield analogous results.24 As Figure 2.9 suggests, when
equality of shares is taken into account, the integration index takes higher values
for EU-15 throughout the entire time period analyzed including also 2009 and the
period preceding 1980s. This is because conformity of ranks is higher in EU-15
and therefore the equal-share relationship is met closer. Nevertheless, the corrected
index value for MENA in 2009 is only 2.35 percent lower than that of EU-15 implying
24The output based computation suggests an abrupt drop in the the degree of integration in EU-
15 after 2001. A look at the data reveals that an abrupt decline in the measure occurs because the
two large EU-15 economies, UK and France, interchange their positions in output share ranking.
The output share of UK increased from 16.00% in 2000 to 16.06% in 2001 and turned out to be
higher than 16.05%, the 2001 output share of France. This must have had a significant impact on
the index as now the observed UK shares were compared to the second largest theoretical share.
Particularly large deviations would become for observed human capital shares, in which the UK
appears to be the fifth ranked country (see also Figure 2.3). Further inspection of the human capital
data in Barro and Lee (2013) reveals that the number of adults with at least completed secondary
education is unusually low in the UK (see Appendix 2.A). Because of possible data inaccuracy we
do not interpret this drop as an actual drop in the extent of integration and conclude that the
degree of integration has been persistently higher in EU-15.
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that the extent of integration in the Middle East is effectively larger than commonly
believed.
2.6 Counterfactuals
The analysis in Klein and Ventura (2009) leads us to conclude that regulation of
labour mobility is a distortion of first-order importance. They quantify that even
small differences in barriers to labour mobility can have substantial implications for
the allocation of labour forces as well as the size of output and capital stocks. In
Bernanke (2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2014), a powerful case is made that demo-
graphic characteristics can also explain global imbalances. This section explores the
quantitative implications of our results.
A country’s stock of human capital in our empirical analysis is measured by
multiplying the percentage of its population aged 15 and over with at least a sec-
ondary level of education times its local population. This construct includes thus
a policy variable, the rate of educational attainment, and a demographic variable,
population. Policy makers can affect the former by closing gender gaps in education
and changing the ending age of compulsory schooling; they can alter the latter by
removing barriers to international labour mobility.
Focusing on the Middle East in year 2010, we compute the distribution of human
capital that would prevail under complete integration. Specifically, given the actual
distribution of human capital in 2010, our numerical exercise solves for the 19 un-
known stocks of human capital such that it matches the MENA theoretical shares
of Table 2.6. Our numerical results are reproduced in column (2) of Table 2.7 and
are compared to actual stocks in column (3).
Results of Table 2.7 suggest that for a large number of countries in the Middle
East a significant increase in human capital is needed to achieve the level compatible
with full integration: the percentage change in column (3) is positive for the ma-
jority of countries. In larger countries with a low percentage of schooled population
(Mauritania, Syria, Yemen)25 most efforts should be devoted to the improvement of
25See also Figure 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A.
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Table 2.7: Counterfactual implications: complete integration.
Country Stock of human capital Difference
Actual (2010) Theoretical (2)(1) − 1, %
(1) (2) (3)
Algeria 12670555 8628558 -31.9
Bahrain 341700 1522687 345.6
Egypt 19101817 12942838 -32.2
Iran 26019339 25885675 -0.5
Iraq 4778917 4314279 -9.7
Jordan 2388708 3697954 54.8
Kuwait 591043 1617855 173.7
Lebanon 1356728 1991206 46.8
Libya 1796990 2353243 31.0
Mauritania 194439 1362404 600.7
Morocco 5074259 5177135 2.0
Oman 1008028 1848977 83.4
Qatar 254767 1438093 464.5
Saudi Arabia 7389469 6471419 -12.4
Sudan 1654617 2157140 30.4
Syria 993174 1725712 73.8
Tunisia 2326392 3235709 39.1
United Arab Emirates 2043778 2876186 40.7
Yemen 1850918 2588568 39.9
educational attainment rates. In smaller economies, like Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait,
sole education policies are, however, unlikely to lead to a sufficiently large increase
of human capital. In those economies education policies must be accompanied with
the ones that could attract more human capital from abroad (e.g. Algeria, Egypt or
Saudi Arabia). The results also indicate that Iran and Morocco do not need major
education or immigration reforms as their stocks of human capital in 2010 are close
to what a fully integrated benchmark implies.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The chapter developed a framework that enables the measurement of the degree of
economic integration among a group of countries. The objective was to construct
an integration benchmark that consists of a steady state equilibrium characterized
by free trade and perfect factor mobility. Metrics were then used to measure the
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distance between the benchmark and the data.
Measurement allowed for a comparison of integration indices over time and across
regions. It was performed on the European Union, Latin America and the Middle
East, the latter being characterized by low intra-regional trade and limited involve-
ment in the global system. We have shown that degrees of integration in 2009 were
very close, that of the Middle East being just 2.4% lower than in EU-15, a benchmark
of "complete" integration.
It is a commonly held view that trade is the instrument of choice to achieve
greater integration. Regions that demonstrate low intra-regional trade are often
concluded to be poorly integrated. The chapter casts doubt on the assertion that
trade is necessary in order to achieve a high level of economic integration among a
group of countries. What we have shown is that international labour and capital
mobility can be powerful instruments to achieve integration even in the absence of
such trade and of institutional arrangements like free trade agreements and WTO
membership.
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2.A Appendix: Data Sources and Methods
Human Capital
For the three groups of countries (MENA, ALADI and EU-15), human capital is
measured as a total population aged 15 and over with at least completed secondary
education26 and is obtained from Barro and Lee’s data set on educational attainment
(version 1.3). The data is on the 5-year interval basis covering the period 1950 - 2010
and is available for all the countries under analysis with the exception of Lebanon
and Oman. The data shows a clear exponential growth and we use cubic spline
interpolation to obtain annual data. The method is illustrated in Figure 2.A.1 with
points representing original figures before interpolation.
Figure 2.A.1: Human capital data interpolation. The example of Iran and Tunisia.
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The data for Lebanon were obtained from the household surveys run by its
national statistical office. The data were available for years 2004, 2007 and 2009
as a ratio of population with at least secondary schooling to total population. We
extrapolated the series by taking the growth rates of the average ratios of human
capital to total population over 15 in Jordan and Turkey. To obtain the data for
Oman we approximated its ratio of population with a complete secondary education
26We consider the sum of the population aged 15 and over with (i) completed secondary edu-
cation as the highest obtained education level and (ii) completed or incomplete tertiary education
as the highest obtained education level.
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to total population over 15 with the average ratio of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The
data on population aged 15 and over was obtained from the United Nations UNSD
Demographic Statistics database. Obtained estimates are comparable to the data
on the percentage of expatriate workers in Oman with at least secondary degree
averaged with the percentage of Omani nationals with at least secondary degree
who are employed in public sector. The data on the latter two indicators is obtained
from the national statistical office in Oman.27 Immigrants make up 28.4% of Omani
population.28
Human capital demonstrates a clear exponential growth. In 2010 human capi-
tal in MENA constituted 32.5% (32.3% Lebanon and Oman excluded) of the total
MENA population aged 15 and over. This ratio is higher when for ALADI (38.7%)
and it is even higher for EU-15 (52.04%). As Figure 2.A.2 suggests around 60%
of adult population in Jordan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Chile have completed at least sec-
ondary education. The ratio is lower than 10% in Sudan, Syria and Mauritania.
Regarding EU-15 an element of concern in our research is the fact that the
percentage of adults with at least completed secondary education is unrealistically
low in the UK (see panel (c) in Figure 2.A.2). This may explain a large drop in our
integration measure when output based computation for EU-15 is performed.
Physical Capital
Data for physical capital in all regions come from Penn World Tables, version 6.2
(PWT 6.2) and cover the period of 1950 - 2004. The data is in constant prices
with the base year of 2000. Measurement units are international dollars. Given that
this is the most recent capital stock data available, year 2000 became a benchmark
reference year for all the real variables included into analysis.
There were two problems associated with the capital stock data in hand. First,
the data was available until the year 2004 only or even until 2003 for most of MENA
countries. Second, no data was available for Lebanon, Libya and Yemen.
27In 1997 21.3% of expatriate workers in Oman had at least secondary education. The percentage
is 17.5% in 2000 and 24.3% in 2005. Source: Own calculations based on the data from Oman
National Statistics.
28Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.
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Figure 2.A.2: Human capital as a share in total population aged 15 and over.
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The first above mentioned problem was solved as follows. We computed the total
investment Iit in constant 2000 prices at time period t for country i using the real
investment-to-GDP ratios available in PWT 6.2. Furthermore, from the inventory
rule
Kit = (1− δit)Kit−1 + Iit
we computed depreciation rates δit and by applying a 5-year moving average we
extended the rates until 2009 (see Figure 2.A.3).
Capital depreciation rates vary between 3% for Sudan and 11% for United Arab
Emirates in 2003. The same range of variation remained for estimated depreciation
rates in 2009.
PWT 7.0 contains investment-to-GDP ratios in constant 2005 prices until 2009.
This allows to compute total investment in constant 2000 prices and extend total
real investment Iit from PWT 6.2 to missing years 2004(2005)-2009. Together with
the estimated depreciation rates it becomes feasible to obtain an estimate of Kit
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Figure 2.A.3: Depreciation rates: the example of Algeria and Mexico.
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for t = 2004(2005), ..., 2009 using inventory rule. It is to mention that total real
investment in 2000 prices differs between the two versions of PWT by almost a
scalar. Growth rates, however, remain almost unchanged (see examples in Figure
2.A.4).
Figure 2.A.4: Difference in total real investment as available in PWT 6.2 and PWT
7.0: the example of Libya and Lebanon.
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To estimate unavailable capital data for Lebanon, Libya and Yemen we em-
ployed real investment-to-GDP ratios available in PWT 7.0. We computed total
investment in constant 2000 prices and we extended the series backwards using for
Libya the growth rates of gross capital formation in constant prices taken from IMF
IFS database and for Yemen using real investment taken from PWT 5.6. As a re-
sult total real investment for the whole period 1970-2009 was obtained. Given total
real investment initial real capital stock Ki0 and depreciation rates δit are sufficient
to compute the whole series of capital using the inventory rule. For Lebanon and
Yemen δit was estimated as the average depreciation rate of Syria and Jordan and
for Libya the average depreciation rate of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt was
taken. Initial capital stock was then estimated as
Ki0 = Yi0
(
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Kj0
Yj0
)
,
where t = 0 is the earliest year for which real capital-to-GDP of partner countries is
available, ni is the number of partner countries for the country in question and Yi0
is a real output of country i at the initial time period. As in case of δit estimation,
Syria and Jordan were taken as partner countries for Lebanon and Tunisia, Morocco,
Algeria and Egypt were taken as partner countries for Libya.
Output
Output in all country groupings, measured by real GDP, is obtained from PWT
7.0. The data ranges from 1950 to 2009 and is expressed in international dollars
to equalize the purchasing power of different currencies and allow for cross-country
level data comparison. PWT 7.0 uses the year 2005 as a base year for all constant
price variables. We use 2000 as the base year in our study. Hence, to convert the
base year of real output to 2000 we find the implicit deflator in 2000 for each of the
countries and rescale 2005 constant price series accordingly.
Most ALADI countries, except Cuba, have output data available as of 1950.
Output of Cuba is available as of 1970. The situation differs for MENA. Only
few countries, namely, Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Morocco have data starting prior to
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1955. In 1970, however, 13 (out of 19) MENA countries do have observations leaving
out Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Libya and Yemen, series
for which start in late 80-ties. The older version of PWT (6.2), however, contains
real GDP data for Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE as of 1970. We used the
growth rates of constant price series taken from PWT 6.2 to extend existing data
backwards. Although some degree of discrepancy is present between data published
in the two versions of PWT, especially for level data of Saudi Arabia and Qatar (see
Figure 2.A.5), the growth rates in overlapping years remain very similar, maintaining
the plausibility of estimated data.
Figure 2.A.5: Output data extension for Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.
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Note: PWT 6.2 (7.0) is an abbreviation for Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (7.0).
Because Yemen Arab Republic and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen were
united in 1990 to form the current Republic of Yemen, most of the international data
sources do not publish data prior to 1990 for the two former republics separately. The
data is neither publicly available on the website of the national statistical authority
of Yemen. The oldest version of PWT (5.6), however, contains a joint 1969 - 1989
GDP per capita for Yemen both in current and constant 1985 prices. It therefore
becomes possible, similarly as described above, to extend available real output data
for Yemen by applying PWT 5.6 growth rates backwards. Although there is some
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difference in the level of real GDP as published in PWT 5.6 and PWT 7.0 respectively
in the common year 1989, it is yet the best estimate we could obtain for Yemen for
the period 1970 - 1989 prior to its unification.
To obtain real output data for Libya for 1970 - 1985 we used its GDP in constant
prices expressed in local currency units from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database of the IMF. Analogously to the case of Yemen we applied the growth
rates backwards to compute the data for missing years.
Average income per capita: MENA and ALADI
Average income per capita measured as GDP per capita in ALADI countries was
9405.8 international dollars in 2009. Average income per capita in the Middle East
on the other hand was more than twice as high amounting to 22618.5 international
dollars.29 This difference, however, is mainly driven by few rich and small oil-
exporting countries, like Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. The boxplot in
Figure 2.A.6 shows that GDP per capita in Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
is more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the third quartile of the GDP per capita
distribution in MENA. These countries are therefore pointed out as outliers.30 The
distribution in ALADI is clearly more homogeneous in the sense that no extreme
observations are present. After the exclusion of Qatar, United Arab Emirates and
Kuwait MENA and ALADI show indeed very similar average income per capita
(10283.3 international dollars in MENA vs. 9405.8 in ALADI, see also the two
rightmost graphs in Figure 2.A.6). Analogous conclusions are drawn also from the
computation of the population weighted average. In MENA the population weighted
average is 8952.7 international dollars and that in ALADI is 10724.8
29Source: Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.0.
30We use the simple interquartile rule to detect outliers. A data point is identified as an outlier
if it is above Q3 + 1.5IQR, where Q3 is the third quartile of the data distribution and IQR is the
measure of the spread of the data around the median defined as the difference between the third
and the first quartiles.
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Figure 2.A.6: Nominal GDP per capita in ALADI and MENA.
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Notes: The leftmost boxplot includes nominal GDP per capita for all the MENA countries. The right-
most boxplot excludes Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait and displays the distribution of nominal
GDP per capita for the remaining 16 MENA countries. Horizontal lines denote sample averages. Year
2009. International dollars.
Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
Chapter 3
Advanced Economy Inflation: the
Role of Global Factors∗
3.1 Introduction
Recent studies document the increased role of global factors in driving domestic
inflation developments, suggesting that it could be important to augment standard
inflation models with global variables.
One strand of the literature has emphasized the importance of global output gap
as a determinant of domestic inflation processes. Borio and Filardo (2007), for ex-
ample, found that proxies for global economic slack added considerable explanatory
power to traditional benchmark inflation equations in advanced economies and that
the role of global factors had grown over time. The relevance of the global output
gap was also supported by Milani (2009) for the US after 1985.1 Other studies (Ihrig
et al., 2010; Calza, 2008; Gerlach et al., 2008), however, find conflicting evidence and
suggest that Borio and Filardo (2007) results are likely to be specific to the esti-
mation sample or particular measurement of the global output gap. No significant
global output gap effects were also detected by Eickmeier and Pijnenburg (2013).
The authors, however, identify that common changes in unit labour costs are im-
∗Joint with David Lodge. Published as an ECB Working Paper, No. 1948, 2016.
1Importance of global output gap is also established in all New Keynesian open economy models
(see, e.g. Clarida et al., 2002, Galí and Monacelli, 2005).
54
portant in determining domestic inflation and conclude that, together with import
prices, foreign competition and global interest rates, their developments should be
carefully observed by policy makers.
A second strand of the literature has focused on the common component in
national inflation rates. Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) note significant co-movement
in advanced economy inflation rates and find that models which include a measure of
global inflation consistently improve benchmark national inflation forecasts.2 Neely
and Rapach (2011) support their view. By analyzing a larger group of countries in
a dynamic factor model setting they find that on average over half of variation in
domestic inflation is explained by an "international" (world or regional) component.3
Mumtaz and Surico (2012) follow a similar approach but focus only on industrialized
economies. They confirm that both the level and persistence of domestic inflation
are reasonably well tracked by a single global factor. Taken together these strands
of the literature suggest that inflation should be modelled as a global rather than a
national phenomenon.
There are a number of reasons why global factors may be playing a more promi-
nent role in shaping domestic inflation dynamics. One argument is that globalization
has rendered national inflation less responsive to domestic capacity constraints, ei-
ther because a sudden expansion in demand for goods would translate into higher
imports rather than into higher prices or because foreign competition constrains wage
or price increases in industries open to global competition, and lowers the sensitivity
of wages to productivity increases (e.g. Guerrieri et al., 2010). Another argument
emphasizes the role of credible monetary policies that stabilized inflation expecta-
tions and trend inflation (e.g. Mishkin, 2009). With domestic price expectations
well anchored proportionally more of the variation in national inflation rates would
be explained by exogenous global price shocks such as commodity price changes.
Understanding the role of global factors may also contribute towards explain-
2Ferroni and Mojon (2014) perform a similar analysis but use a wider range of forecasting
models and include the 2008/2009 recession in the forecasting sample. The authors draw similar
conclusions - global inflation augmented model performs better than other inflation forecasting
models.
3Instead of aggregate inflation rates Monacelli and Sala (2009) use sectoral CPI data in four
advanced economies and find that one international common factor explains 15-30% of variation
in inflation. They consider it to be a lower bound of common variation in domestic inflation.
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ing some recent inflation puzzles. Output fell sharply after the 2008/2009 recession.
However, inflation in advanced economies remained more resilient, which raised ques-
tions about the apparent decline in the sensitivity of inflation to economic slack (e.g.
IMF, 2013). From mid-2011, however, simultaneous declines in inflation across many
advanced economies raised further questions about the “commonality” of inflation
trends and whether this reflected well-defined shocks from global economic slack on
domestic inflation or other common factors. Yet, more recent heterogeneous infla-
tion developments – with euro area inflation declining further than in other advanced
economies – may have shifted the focus again towards domestic factors influencing
inflation trends.
In this chapter, we assess the role of global factors in a traditional Phillips curve
framework. We first augment advanced economy Phillips curves with measures
of global economic slack, test their significance and assess whether their role has
changed over time. We then assess the role of global inflation in helping to forecast
domestic inflation rates. Section 3.2 outlines the method and approach. Section 3.3
discusses the results and robustness. Section 3.4 concludes. Appendix 3.A contains
a detailed data description and additional results from model estimations.
3.2 Phillips Curve Estimates: Methods and Approach
We investigate the role of global factors in domestic inflation processes by aug-
menting standard Phillips curve specifications with a series of global variables. We
estimate separate equations for each advanced economy in the sample, using quar-
terly data over the period 1970q1-2014q3.4 The model is of the following general
form:
piit = αi + βipi
e
it + γiyit +
K∑
k=1
θk,izk,it + δift + it, (3.1)
4The sample includes 19 advanced OECD economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. Starting date varies per country.
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where the dependent variable piit is headline inflation rate in country i at time t,
computed using year-on-year changes in CPI5 and ft is a global factor.
The pieit term denotes expected inflation. According to the expectations formation
process we distinguish three Phillips curve specifications. Namely, (i) a traditional
backward-looking specification as in Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) with adap-
tive expectations given by (3.2) (ii) a micro-founded New-Keynesian specification
with forward-looking expectations (3.3) which open up a channel for a credible mon-
etary authority to affect inflation (e.g., Woodford, 2003) and (iii) a hybrid Phillips
curve as in Galí and Gertler (1999) with the expectations term (3.4) that combines
the first two.6
βipi
e
it = βiEt−1piit =
L∑
l=1
βl,ipii,t−l (3.2)
βipi
e
it = βiEtpii,t+h (3.3)
βipi
e
it =
L∑
l=1
βl,ipii,t−l + βiEtpii,t+h (3.4)
In (3.2)-(3.4) L denotes the number of included inflation lags and h is the forward-
looking horizon for inflation expectations. The most general, hybrid, Phillips curve
includes both lagged inflation terms and a term that captures forward-looking in-
flation expectations. Because rational expectations are not entirely observable in
agents’ behaviour we use a survey based measure of long-term inflation expectations
taken from Consensus Economics.7 Other Phillips curve specifications include one
of the two components. Data availability means that the estimation samples differ:
5This definition of inflation has no seasonal pattern by construction.
6Despite having no clear microfoundations and being subject to the Lucas critique, backward-
looking Phillips curve is common in empirical literature due to its ability to fit actual inflation
data reasonably well (O’Reilly and Whelan, 2005; Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003; Paloviita, 2008; Stock
and Watson, 2007). The micro-founded New-Keynesian Phillips curve, instead, avoids the Lucas
critique, appears in a substantial number of theoretical papers, but shows rather inconclusive
empirical support (Rudd and Whelan, 2007, Mavroeidis et al., 2014).
7We use 6 to 10 years ahead inflation forecasts from Consensus Economics. The data are
available on a biannual basis since 1990. We interpolate the data using cubic splines to obtain
quarterly series.
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backward-looking Phillips curves are estimated from 1970s onwards; forward-looking
and hybrid curves from early 1990s. In the specifications that include lags of infla-
tion the lag order is selected separately for each country on the basis of the four
standard information criteria,8 limiting the maximum number of lags to four. Our
preferred lag order is the order selected by most of the criteria.
The next term in the Phillips curve (3.1) is domestic slack yit measured with
an unemployment and output gap available in OECD Economic Outlook and IMF
World Economic Outlook databases. For the countries with unavailable quarterly
data on the output gap and the non-accelerating rate of unemployment (NAIRU),
used to compute the unemployment gap, we use cubic splines to interpolate annual
data to quarterly.
The variables zk,it are K additional exogenous factors commonly found to affect
inflation rate. We tested a range of various explanatory variables such as the year-
on-year percentage changes in the price of oil, natural gas, all commodities excluding
energy, money supply (M3),9 real and nominal effective exchange rates. Our final
models included only the variables that were typically significant in country estima-
tions, i.e. change in oil price, change in non-energy prices, and change in nominal
effective exchange rate.10
The global factor ft includes estimates of global economic slack and global infla-
tion. For a measure of global economic slack we considered both aggregate OECD
estimates of the unemployment gap and output gap. The estimates are based on
the 34 member countries of the OECD and as such are not limited only to advanced
economies.11 To investigate the role of global inflation, we considered: (i) a simple
8Akaike’s information criterion, Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion, the final prediction
error and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion.
9The link between inflation and low-frequency movements in money growth is studied, for
example, in Gerlach (2004) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008). Unlike the authors
we do not extract the low-frequency component from the year-on-year M3 growth as long-term
inflation expectations and global inflation in our models already capture this trend. Instead, we
include the unfiltered year-on-year growth in M3. We detect no significant contribution of money
growth that would go beyond what is already embedded in our measures of inflation expectations.
10Exchange rate in our data set is expressed in units of foreign currency per unit of domestic so
that an increase in exchange rate corresponds to domestic currency appreciation.
11In addition to the 19 countries we consider, global OECD measures include Chile, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey.
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average of inflation rates in the 19 economies under analysis and (ii) the aggregate
OECD inflation rate based on all the 34 member countries. We have also considered
the first principal component estimated on the full sample of 19 inflation rates. Be-
cause it appeared to essentially proxy average inflation, we excluded it from further
analysis.
We estimate (3.1) by the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM; Hansen,
1982) to address the risk of endogeneity of some explanatory variables. Survey-based
measure of (unobservable) inflation expectations may contain measurement errors
that could lead to endogeneity bias. Likewise, the bias may arise due to simultane-
ity between actual inflation and some of the right-hand-side variables such as the
global factor. While endogeneity of the global factor may not be a serious concern
for smaller economies, it may well be so for larger countries that mainly determine
its value. As instruments in the GMM estimation we consider two lags of inflation
expectations and two lags of global factor.12 To address slight serial correlation in
the residuals we use Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) esti-
mates of the covariance matrix (Newey and West, 1987) with a Bartlett kernel and
an automatic Newey-West bandwidth selection (Newey and West, 1994).
3.3 Results: the Role of Global Factors in Standard
Phillips Curve Estimates
In this section we focus principally on the role of global factors in our Phillips
curve estimates, assessing first the role of global slack and second the importance of
measures of global inflation. Appendix 3.A provides more detail on other aspects of
the Phillips curve estimates (see Table 3.A.1).
Overall, those estimates are consistent with the existing literature. Inflation is
highly persistent across most countries with lagged inflation terms highly significant
regardless of whether we control for forward-looking inflation expectations. More-
over, the Phillips curves that contain lagged inflation terms fit actual inflation data
12Adding other instruments does not bring significant changes to the estimates nor improves
the outcome of model diagnostic tests. With a very few exceptions the J-test does not reject the
overidentifying restrictions (see Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A).
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considerably better than the pure forward-looking Phillips curve. The fit of the
forward-looking Phillips curve is nevertheless moderate rather than weak favouring
in general the use of survey-based inflation expectations in empirical New Keynesian
Phillips Curve research (see Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A). Our results also confirm
a prominent role for commodity price developments, which account for an important
part of headline inflation dynamics, and a modest role for domestic slack variables,
with coefficients on the unemployment and output gaps typically significant but
small for the majority of countries (see Figure 3.1 and Figures 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 in
Appendix 3.A).
3.3.1 The Role of Global Economic Slack
We find little evidence for the role of global economic slack in driving national
inflation developments. In hybrid Phillips curves, estimated from the 1990s onwards,
the coefficients on global output gaps are small and insignificant for most of the
countries in our sample. Moreover, significant coefficients are typically negatively
signed (Figure 3.2). Although a negative sign may arise in some cases because
of, for example, the amount of relative price adjustment in tradables, most of the
literature looks for a positive relationship (see, e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007, Milani,
2009). Identical conclusions can be drawn by replacing global output gaps with
global unemployment gaps (Figure 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A). Global output gaps
remain insignificant also in backward-looking Phillips curves estimated since 1970.
Furthermore, we find little evidence that the role of global economic slack in
driving national inflation dynamics is increasing. Rolling regressions suggest that
the flattening of the Phillips curve was a common phenomenon across advanced eco-
nomies, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 3.3).13 Although, after the
2008/2009 recession there is some evidence of the steepening, particularly notable
for the major euro area economies. These results are in line with a number of recent
empirical studies. Oinonen and Paloviita (2014), for example, document the recent
steepening of the euro area Phillips curve while IMF (2013) provides evidence of the
13Notably we find no support for the flattening of the Phillips curve for the major euro area
economies. Although coefficients on the domestic unemployment gap have varied over time they
do not display a trend decline.
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Figure 3.1: Estimated coefficient of do-
mestic output gap γi in a hybrid Phillips
curve.
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) Dark blue bars denote statistically
significant (10% significance level) positively
signed estimates; (ii) Estimated by GMM.
Figure 3.2: Estimated coefficient of
global output gap δi in a hybrid Phillips
curve.
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) Dark blue bars denote statistically
significant positively signed estimates (10% sig-
nificance level). Red bars denote statisti-
cally significant negatively signed estimates;
(ii) Global output gap is measured by OECD
output gap.
flattening of the Phillips curves for a sample of 21 advanced economies. However, de-
spite the decreased role of domestic slack we do not find evidence of a simultaneously
increasing role of global slack (Figure 3.4). Rolling estimates of coefficients on the
global unemployment gap are typically insignificant and have been fairly stable over
time. We find similar evidence when we use output gaps rather than unemployment
gaps (Figures 3.A.3 and 3.A.4).
3.3.2 The Role of Global Inflation Measures
We find that global inflation is a significant explanatory factor in inflation models
estimated since 1970s. In backward-looking Phillips curves augmented with mea-
sures of global inflation and estimated from 1970s onwards the coefficient on global
inflation is statistically significant for more than half of the countries in our sample.14
14The OECD inflation variable is statistically significant for 11 out of 19 advanced economies we
consider. This result does not change with the measure of domestic economic slack (unemployment
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Figure 3.3: Rolling coefficient of domes-
tic unemployment gap γi in a backward-
looking Phillips curve.
(range of estimates of coefficients across coun-
tries)
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample cov-
ers 1971q1-1985q4 (60 quarters). Rolled for-
ward by one quarter at a time; (ii) The co-
efficient is displayed with a negative sign;
(iii) Eq.(3.1)-(3.2) are estimated by OLS with
L = 2 and ft measured by GDP weighted un-
employment gap of 12 advanced economies;
(iv) The chart is based on estimation results
for 19 economies.
Figure 3.4: Rolling coefficient of global
unemployment gap δi in a backward-
looking Phillips curve.
(range of estimates of coefficients across coun-
tries)
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample covers
1971q1-1985q4 (60 quarters). Rolled forward
by one quarter at a time; (ii) The coefficient is
displayed with a negative sign; (iii) Eq.(3.1)-
(3.2) are estimated by OLS with L = 2 and
ft measured by GDP weighted unemployment
gap of 12 advanced economies; (iv) The chart
is based on estimation results for 19 econo-
mies.
However, for a shorter sample, from 1990s onwards, and in a hybrid Phillips curve,
which includes long-term inflation expectations, the coefficients on global inflation
are smaller and typically insignificant (Figure 3.5). Backward-looking Phillips curves
estimated using a decreasing sample size also suggest that the importance of OECD
inflation has declined. Figures 3.A.5 and 3.A.6 in Appendix 3.A show estimates
of the backward-looking Phillips curves with a decreasing window. It is evident
that when the 1970s and early 1980s are included in the estimation sample, OECD
inflation is significant in most countries. Once the 1970s-80s are excluded from the
sample, OECD inflation plays a less important role.
or output gap).
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity to global inflation δi across different Phillips curve specifica-
tions.
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The chart displays the minimum, quartiles and the maximum of GMM
estimates of sensitivity to global inflation δi. Points mark the average; (ii) The sample
includes 14 countries and euro area aggregate for which inflation expectations data
is available; (iii) Domestic slack in the Phillips curves is measured by unemployment
gap.
How might we interpret these results? Why is global inflation a significant ex-
planatory variable in the backward-looking Phillips curve estimated from 1970s but
not in a hybrid curve estimated from 1990s onwards? Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010)
offered two explanations for the prominent role for global inflation in forecasting
national inflation - a structural and a statistical interpretation. The first expla-
nation is that the global inflation component captures structural factors - i.e. the
influence of global developments on national inflation processes (e.g. through the
impact of commodity prices developments) or commonalities in the business cy-
cles. The second explanation is more statistical and suggests that incorporating
a global inflation measure is helpful because it identifies slow-moving trends in na-
tional inflation processes. Faust and Wright (2013), for example, argue that inflation
forecasts at horizons beyond a couple of quarters should have mechanisms to cap-
ture low-frequency local mean dynamics. The second view therefore emphasizes the
role of global inflation in helping to identify these slow-moving trends in national
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inflation rates. Our findings would tend to point towards this second, statistical ex-
planation. We find that global inflation is highly significant for equations estimated
during periods of significant changes in inflation trends (i.e. the 1970-80s). But
from the mid-1990s onwards, when inflation trends converged to more stable rates,
global inflation becomes considerably less helpful in explaining domestic inflation
dynamics. We also find that once survey inflation expectations are included in the
model, global inflation ceases to play an important role. Moreover, global inflation
and (long-term) inflation expectations measures have shown a high correlation over
time (see Table 3.A.3 and Figure 3.A.7 in Appendix 3.A). These findings suggest,
to us, that global inflation helps in explaining domestic inflation dynamics within
the reduced-form Phillips curve, possibly, because it acts as a proxy for (domestic)
inflation expectations by capturing slow-moving trends in inflation rates.
To further understand the role of global inflation in explaining inflation dynam-
ics we compare standard inflation forecasting equations with those augmented with
global inflation. Following Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) we estimate pairs of alter-
native inflation forecasting models for each country. We run out-of-sample forecasts
and compare root mean squared errors (RMSE) for the competing models over one-
and two-year-ahead forecast horizons. To replicate the exercise as closely as possi-
ble the benchmark forecasting model we consider is the global inflation augmented
autoregression:
piit = αi0 + αi1(L)piit + αi2(L)ft + uit,
where ft is global inflation. We contrast this model, first, with the standard au-
toregression, that links current inflation to its lagged values, and, second, with the
inflation expectations augmented autoregression, that links current inflation to its
lagged values and domestic inflation expectations:
piit = βi0 + βi1(L)piit + βi2(L)pi
e,LT
it + uit,
where pie,LTit are long-term inflation expectations. As in Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010)
in all the forecasting models we fix the order of lag polynomials αi2(L) and βi2(L)
to four and we let the order of αi1(L) and βi1(L) to be determined by the standard
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Bayesian information criterion at every forecast generating stage. We start with the
estimation sample of ten years and we subsequently increase it with one observation
at a time. At every stage we re-select the optimal number of lags, re-run the esti-
mation and compute the h-step ahead inflation forecast pii,t+h|t given inflation data
up to point t.
Individual country forecast results are provided in Table 3.A.4 of Appendix 3.A.
Table 3.1 summarizes the results across countries, showing the percentage of coun-
tries for which each model statistically outperformed the rival model.15
Table 3.1: Forecasting performance of global inflation augmented model
relative to standard autoregression.
(percent of country models in which particular model is significantly better
than competitor)
Model that produces significantly One-year-
ahead Two-years-aheadlower forecast RMSEs
Forecasting sample: 1981q4-2014q3
Global inflation augmented 77.8% 83.3%autoregression
Standard autoregression 5.6% 5.6%
Forecasting sample: 2002q1-2014q3
Global inflation augmented 5.6% 0.0%autoregression
Standard autoregression 16.7% 27.8%
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The table summarises forecasting performance results of 18 economies (individ-
ual country results are provided in Table 3.A.4 of Appendix 3.A); (ii) Initial estimation
sample covers 10 years of data (1971q1 - 1980q4 and 1991q2 - 2001q1 respectively). The
sample is subsequently augmented with one observation at a time to produce the next
h-step-ahead forecast; (iii) Estimated by OLS.
Forecast comparisons show that global inflation only improves inflation forecasts
in models estimated since 1970s, but not in those estimated since 1990s. We confirm
the result of Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) that, indeed, the model augmented with
global inflation significantly outperforms the standard autoregression for the major-
ity of countries (upper panel of Table 3.1). However, this is only the case when the
15Since there are some countries for which the forecast performance of the two models is statis-
tically indistinguishable the figures in Table 3.1 and 3.2 do not sum to 100%. We test statistical
distinguishability using the Diebold-Mariano test statistic (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) with boot-
strapped critical values.
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models are estimated on a sample that includes the 1970-80s, a period of high and
volatile inflation rates. When the models are estimated from 1991 and used to fore-
cast inflation from 2002 onwards, the measure of global inflation does not provide
significant improvement to the forecasting ability of a simple autoregression (lower
panel of Table 3.1). Indeed, at one- and two-year-ahead horizons it is a statistically
better performer only in 5.6% and 0.0% of cases, respectively.
As a further test to enhance our understanding of the role of global inflation, we
also compared two further models: one which augments an autoregressive model with
global inflation and another which augments it with long-term inflation expectations.
The period for comparison is somewhat shorter as availability of long-term inflation
expectations limits the forecasting sample to 2002 onwards. Nevertheless, the results
point to a broadly similar forecasting performance of models augmented with global
inflation and inflation expectations. Indeed, if anything, the models with inflation
expectations augmented model performed slightly better (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Forecasting performance of inflation expectations augmented
model relative to global inflation augmented model.
(percent of country models in which particular model is significantly better
than competitor)
Model that produces significantly One-year-
ahead Two-years-aheadlower forecast RMSEs
Forecasting sample: 2002q1-2014q3
Global inflation augmented 0.0% 0.0%autoregression
Inflation expectations augmented 23.1% 15.4%autoregression
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The table summarises forecasting performance results of 13 economies (individ-
ual country results are provided in Table 3.A.5 of Appendix 3.A); (ii) Initial estimation
sample covers 1991q2 - 2001q1 (10 years). The sample is subsequently augmented with
one observation at a time; (iii) Estimated by OLS.
We are able to perform this exercise over a longer horizon for the US. Using
combined Livingston and Blue Chip long-term inflation forecasts since 1979 we find
that our conclusions remain valid. The RMSE of the model augmented with infla-
tion expectations relative to the global inflation augmented model is insignificantly
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different from one.16
3.3.3 Robustness Analysis
We perform several robustness checks to confirm the validity of our findings. We start
by showing that our results are robust to using core rather than headline inflation
data as a dependent variable. Estimation results with core inflation in (3.1) are
broadly similar to those with headline the only difference being considerably reduced,
often insignificant, effects of commodity prices. We conclude that commodity prices,
included as exogenous factors, reasonably well capture temporary fluctuations of
food and energy components in headline inflation and do not drive our main results.
Considering that overall price stability is the policy goal of a central bank we keep
the focus on headline inflation in the main text.
Furthermore, we find that our results do not change when we replace year-on-year
headline inflation with annualized seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter headline
inflation rates. Annual inflation measured by year-on-year rates is approximately the
sum of quarterly (log) CPI differences. Thus, using year-on-year rates may introduce
a moving average component to inflation data, which can complicate econometric
inference. Annualized quarter-on-quarter inflation based on seasonally adjusted CPI
data circumvents this drawback. By replacing year-on-year inflation with quarter-on-
quarter we find that our results on the significance of global slack and global inflation
measures remain unchanged. Estimates based on quarter-on-quarter inflation rates,
however, deliver larger in magnitude sensitivities.
Finally, our results are robust to using lagged rather than contemporaneous mea-
sures of global economic slack. It might be that foreign or domestic measures of real
activity affect inflation with some delay either directly or via other factors, which
a single-equation model with contemporaneous explanatory variables is unable to
capture. Bianchi and Civelli (2013), for example, while not finding significant direct
effects of global slack on domestic inflation, provide evidence that might suggest the
presence of indirect channels. A study by Milani (2010), based on Bayesian esti-
mation of a structural model for a sample of G-7 economies, also presents evidence
16RMSE is 0.99 for one-year- and 0.95 for two-year-ahead forecasts.
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suggesting that global slack affects inflation via its influence on domestic output. It
may therefore be that there is a lag until global slack has its impact on domestic
inflation. We tried including up to four periods lagged GDP weighted unemploy-
ment gaps and OECD output gaps in the hybrid Phillips curve equation. This did
not alter our conclusions. Regardless of its measure and with a very few exceptions
(Table 3.3) global slack continues to be statistically insignificant. The results are
similar when lagged domestic slack is used instead.
Table 3.3: Percent of countries for which a significant positively (resp. negatively)
signed global output (resp. unemployment) gap is found.
Domestic slack Global slack Percent ofcountries
Output gap OECD output gap 6.67
Output gap 1-quarter lagged OECD output gap 6.67
Output gap 2-quarters lagged OECD output gap 6.67
Output gap 3-quarters lagged OECD output gap 6.67
Output gap 4-quarters lagged OECD output gap 6.67
Unemployment gap GDP weighted unemployment gap 13.33
Unemployment gap 1-quarter lagged GDP weighted unemployment gap 13.33
Unemployment gap 2-quarters lagged GDP weighted unemployment gap 6.67
Unemployment gap 3-quarters lagged GDP weighted unemployment gap 6.67
Unemployment gap 4-quarters lagged GDP weighted unemployment gap 6.67
Notes: (i) Hybrid Philllips curve results; (ii) Total number of countries is 15 (14 countries and euro area
aggregate); (iii) The calculation of the GDP weighted unemployment gap is based on unemployment
gap data for 12 major advanced economies; (iv) 5% significance level.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have examined the extent to which advanced economy inflation
can be considered to be a global phenomenon. While we confirm that commodity
prices have a strong effect on headline inflation, our results provide little support for
other global factors as prominent drivers of domestic inflation dynamics.
First, we detect no direct effects of global economic slack on domestic inflation
for the majority of advanced economies. Second, we find that measures of global
inflation are helpful for forecasting domestic inflation rates during periods of signif-
icant variation in global inflation trends, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, but
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have been much less useful since the mid-1990s when inflation has been more sta-
ble. From the mid-1990s onwards, as inflation trends have converged and become
more stable, measures of global inflation have considerably less power for forecast-
ing inflation dynamics. Moreover, survey measures of (national) long-term inflation
expectations appear to perform much the same task as global inflation in explaining
domestic inflation developments. These findings suggest, to us, that global inflation
matters because it acts as a proxy for (national) inflation expectations by capturing
slow-moving trends in inflation rates.
Our analysis though is limited to reduced-form Phillips curves and univariate
inflation forecasting models. It might be possible that global slack influences inflation
through indirect channels that are not modelled in this framework. Nonetheless, our
results strongly exclude the existence of large direct effects of global factors on
domestic inflation and overall suggest that, with the exception of commodity prices,
there is little reason to include global factors into traditional reduced-form Phillips
curves.
3.A Appendix: Data and Additional Results
Table 3.A.1: GMM estimates of the backward-looking and hybrid Phillips curves for G-7 economies.
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Backward-looking Phillips curve
Intercept 0.19 0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.10 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.20 0.11
1-quarter lagged inflation 0.89∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
2-quarters lagged inflation -0.22∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.08 0.05 -0.13 -0.16∗∗ -0.07
3-quarters lagged inflation 0.04 0.25∗∗ 0.12 0.11
4-quarters lagged inflation 0.06 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.15∗ 0.14∗
Output gap 0.05 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.07∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.01 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05∗∗
Change in oil price 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Change in non-energy prices 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01∗∗
OECD output gap -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.10∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.13
OECD inflation 0.06∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.00 0.04 0.05
Change in NEER -0.02 -0.02∗ 0.00 -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.01
P-value of the J-test 0.52 0.26 0.93 0.01 0.68 0.01 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.35 0.78 0.22 0.74 0.22
Number of obs 116 175 115 135 115 135 115 135 115 174 116 136 116 175
Hybrid Phillips curve
Intercept -0.19 -0.72 -0.40∗∗ -0.26 -0.58∗ -0.73 -0.11 -0.08 0.35 0.34 -0.39 -0.36 -0.45∗ -0.63∗∗
1-quarter lagged inflation 0.86∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
2-quarters lagged inflation -0.22∗ -0.22∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗
Inflation expectations 0.35 0.61∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.70∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.08 0.20 0.18 0.54∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
Output gap -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.06∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Change in oil price 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Change in non-energy prices 0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00
OECD output gap 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08 0.09
OECD inflation -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.04
Change in NEER -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02∗ -0.03∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04∗∗
P-value of the J-test 0.14 0.03 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.06 0.82 0.47 0.58 0.24 0.84 0.79 0.09 0.76
R-squared 0.79 0.78 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.83 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.86
Number of obs 98 98 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is headline CPI inflation; (ii) Estimated by GMM; (iii) Instruments include two lags of OECD output gap/OECD inflation and, in
the hybrid Phillips curve, include additionally two lags of inflation expectations; (iv) Significance stars *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively.
Table 3.A.2: GMM estimates of the forward-looking Phillips curves for G-7 economies.
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Forward-looking Phillips curve
Intercept 0.37 -0.23 -0.75 -0.48 -2.10∗∗∗ -3.60∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.66∗∗ 0.50 0.25 0.22 0.49 -0.46 1.53∗∗
Inflation expectations 0.66 0.83∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.39 0.08 0.82 0.47 0.95∗∗∗ -0.49
Output gap -0.01 0.15 0.24∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.08 0.43∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.17 -0.01 -0.18∗∗∗ 0.02
Change in oil price 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.01 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
Change in non-energy prices -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
OECD output gap 0.15∗∗ -0.05 0.11∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.08 0.13 0.40∗∗∗
OECD inflation 0.11 0.04 -0.14 0.42∗∗∗ 0.16 0.19 0.68∗∗∗
Change in NEER 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.04 0.00 -0.07∗∗∗
P-value of the J-test 0.13 0.19 0.79 0.07 0.13 0.91 0.23 0.23 0.81 0.32 0.36 0.29 0.19 0.22
R-squared 0.40 0.38 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.64 0.87 0.85 0.65 0.62 0.35 0.36 0.67 0.74
Number of obs 98 98 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is headline CPI inflation; (ii) Estimated by GMM; (iii) Instruments include two lags of OECD output gap/OECD inflation and two
lags of inflation expectations; (iv) Significance stars *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Figure 3.A.1: Estimated coefficient of
domestic unemployment gap γi in a hy-
brid Phillips curve.
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Japan
France
Australia
Euro Area
Sweden
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Germany
Spain
Italy
Canada
Switzerland
United States
United Kingdom
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) Dark blue bars denote statistically
significant negatively signed estimates (10%
significance level). Red bars denote statistically
significant positively signed estimates; (ii)
Estimated by GMM.
Figure 3.A.2: Estimated coefficient of
global (OECD) unemployment gap δi in
a hybrid Phillips curve.
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Notes: (i) Dark blue bars denote statistically
significant negatively signed estimates (10%
significance level). Red bars denote statis-
tically significant positively signed estimates;
(ii) Global unemployment gap is measured by
OECD unemployment gap.
Figure 3.A.3: Rolling coefficient of do-
mestic output gap γi in a backward-
looking Phillips curve.
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample covers
1985q4-2000q3 (60 quarters). Rolled forward
by one quarter at a time; (ii) Eq.(3.1)-(3.2) are
estimated by OLS with L = 2 and ft measured
by OECD output gap; (iii) The chart is based
on estimation results for 19 economies.
Figure 3.A.4: Rolling coefficient of
global output gap δi in a backward-
looking Phillips curve.
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample covers
1985q4-2000q3 (60 quarters). Rolled forward
by one quarter at a time; (ii) Eq.(3.1)-(3.2) are
estimated by OLS with L = 2 and ft measured
by OECD output gap; (iii) The chart is based
on estimation results for 19 economies.
Table 3.A.4: RMSE of global inflation augmented model relative to RMSE
of standard autoregression.
Country One-year-ahead Two-years-ahead
Forecasting sample: 1981q4-2014q3
Australia 0.82 0.66
Austria 0.85 0.82
Belgium 0.67 0.51
Canada 0.76 0.65
Denmark 0.73 0.58
Finland 0.70 0.55
France 0.81 0.66
Germany 1.11 1.15
Italy 0.43 0.27
Japan 0.98 1.02
Luxembourg 0.85 0.73
Netherlands 0.80 0.76
New Zealand 0.93 0.81
Norway 0.83 0.73
Spain 0.66 0.44
Sweden 0.75 0.59
United Kingdom 0.82 0.45
United States 0.94 0.98
Forecasting sample: 2002q1-2014q3
Australia 0.90 1.11
Austria 0.94 0.96
Belgium 0.90 1.22
Canada 0.97 0.87
Denmark 1.14 1.19
Finland 1.16 1.21
France 1.09 1.16
Germany 1.22 1.06
Italy 1.03 1.04
Japan 0.94 1.05
Luxembourg 1.07 1.23
Netherlands 0.94 0.88
New Zealand 1.07 1.07
Norway 1.01 1.13
Spain 0.98 1.02
Sweden 0.92 1.10
United Kingdom 1.03 1.08
United States 1.04 1.07
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) Bold entries denote ratios statistically significant at a 5% level; (ii) Initial
estimation sample covers 10 years of data (1971q1 - 1980q4 and 1991q2 - 2001q1 respec-
tively). The sample is subsequently augmented with one observation at a time; (iii)
Estimated by OLS.
Figure 3.A.5: Coefficient of OECD infla-
tion in a backward-looking Phillips curve
(decreasing window).
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample cov-
ers 1970q1-2014q3. Then the estimation win-
dow is decreased by one quarter each time,
i.e. the second estimation sample is 1970q2-
2014q3, then 1970q3-2014q3, etc.; (ii) The
chart ignores significance of the coefficient of
OECD inflation in country-by-country regres-
sions; (iii) Eq. (1)-(2) are estimated by OLS
with L = 2 and ft measured by OECD infla-
tion; (iv) The charts are based on estimation
results for 19 economies.
Figure 3.A.6: Coefficient of OECD infla-
tion in a backward-looking Phillips curve
(decreasing window).
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Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) The initial estimation sample covers
1970q1-2014q3. Then the estimation window
is decreased by one quarter each time, i.e. the
second estimation sample is 1970q2-2014q3,
then 1970q3-2014q3, etc.; (ii) Before plotting
the chart insignificant coefficient values are set
to zero in country-by-country Phillips curves;
(iii) Eq. (1)-(2) are estimated by OLS with
L = 2 and ft measured by OECD inflation;
(iv) The charts are based on estimation results
for 19 economies.
Figure 3.A.7: Comovement of global
(OECD) inflation and Consensus long-
term inflation expectations.
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Table 3.A.3: Correlations between
global (OECD) inflation and Consensus
long-term inflation expectations.
Country Correlation coefficient
Australia 0.70
Canada 0.58
France 0.69
Germany 0.75
Italy 0.76
Japan 0.61
Netherlands 0.72
New Zealand -0.69
Norway 0.03
Spain 0.51
Sweden 0.67
Switzerland 0.24
United Kingdom 0.75
United States 0.83
Table 3.A.5: RMSE of inflation expectations augmented model relative to
RMSE of global inflation augmented model.
Country One-year-ahead Two-years-ahead
Forecasting sample: 2002q1-2014q3
Australia 1.03 0.81
Canada 1.09 1.12
France 1.06 1.06
Germany 0.87 1.03
Italy 0.80 0.72
Japan 1.06 0.99
Netherlands 0.84 0.83
New Zealand 0.85 0.62
Norway 0.79 0.88
Spain 1.01 0.90
Sweden 0.97 0.94
United Kingdom 1.11 1.15
United States 1.03 1.05
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: (i) Bold entries denote ratios statistically significant at a 5% level; (ii) Initial esti-
mation sample covers 1991q2 - 2001q1 (10 years). The sample is subsequently augmented
with one observation at a time; (iii) Estimated by OLS.
Table 3.A.6: Data definitions and sources.
Variable Transformation Source Frequency Notes
Dependent variables
Headline inflation Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly Computed using Consumer Price Index
(2010=100) .
Core inflation Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly Computed using CPI of all items excl. food and
energy (2010=100) .
Domestic variables
Unemployment
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly 1970q1 - 1992q1 data for Germany is taken from
FAME (West Germany).
Real effective ex-
change rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly
Nominal effective
exchange rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly
Real GDP Haver Analytics Quarterly
Output gap Haver Analytics Annual Percentage deviation of actual real GDP from its
potential counterpart as estimated by IMF. Data
was interpolated to quarterly frequency using cu-
bic splines. For Canada, Japan and US national
quarterly output gap estimates were used. As
an alternative to IMF estimates we also consider
output gap measured as a cyclical component of
the Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to quarterly
real GDP data in logarithms. For the Hodrick-
Prescott filter we use the typical for quarterly data
smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
Non-accelerating
inflation rate of
unemployment
(NAIRU)
Haver Analytics Annual For US national quarterly estimates of long-
term natural rate of unemployment equivalent to
NAIRU were used. For other countries annual
OECD estimates were taken. Data was interpo-
lated to quarterly frequency using cubic splines.
Continued on next page
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Variable Transformation Source Frequency Notes
Broad money Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly M3 data in local currency units or in index terms.
For Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Spain and UK growth rates of FAME data were
used to extend Haver data.
Long-term infla-
tion expectations
Consensus Eco-
nomics
Biannual Average expected consumer price inflation 6 to 10
years ahead. Data was interpolated to quarterly
frequency using cubic splines.
Industrial produc-
tion index
Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly
Standard VAT
rate
Year-on-
year differ-
ence
OECD Consump-
tion Tax Trends
2014; European
Commission “VAT
rates applied in
the member states
of the European
Community”;
www.vatlive.com;
www.tradingeconomics.com
Quarterly Standard non-reduced value-added/goods and ser-
vices tax rate applicable in the entire or the largest
part of the country. May be particularly impor-
tant to control for in countries like Japan, where
all the three VAT increases since 1989 were nearly
fully passed through to consumer prices.
Global variables
OECD unemploy-
ment rate
Haver Analytics Annual OECD estimate of global unemployment rate.
OECD NAIRU OECD Economic
Outlook 2014
Annual OECD estimate based on the 34 member countries
of the OECD. Data was interpolated to quarterly
frequency using cubic splines.
OECD unemploy-
ment gap
Own calculations Quarterly Computed as a difference between OECD unem-
ployment rate and OECD NAIRU.
OECD output gap Haver Analytics Annual OECD estimate of the global output gap based
on the 34 member countries of the OECD. Data
was interpolated to quarterly frequency using cu-
bic splines.
OECD inflation Haver Analytics Annual OECD estimate based on the 34 member countries
of the OECD.
Continued on next page
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Variable Transformation Source Frequency Notes
Average oil price Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly Price index representing average spot price of UK
Brent (light)/Dubai (medium)/Alaska (heavy)
crude oils
Natural gas price
index
Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly Natural gas price index
HWWI price index
(all commodities)
Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly HWWI commodity price index (all commodities)
in USD constructed by Hamburg Institute of In-
ternational Economics.
HWWI price in-
dex (all commodi-
ties excl. energy)
Year-on-
year growth
rate
Haver Analytics Quarterly Commodity price index (all commodities excl. en-
ergy) in USD constructed by Hamburg Institute of
International Economics.

Chapter 4
Trade Policy Options of Ukraine:
East or West∗
4.1 Introduction
December 1, 2016 will mark the 25th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the proclamation of fifteen new independent states. In this time span,
former Soviet countries faced the troublesome transition from planned to market
economies and went through reforms in institutional, political and social spheres.
Some countries celebrated the independence they re-gained and quickly set their
priorities on the integration with the European Union. Other newly proclaimed
states were keen to preserve former economic ties. The latter, including Ukraine,
founded the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an agreement whose goal
was to form a common economic space with free movement of goods, services, labour
and capital.1
Over the years, the ruling system of Ukraine meandered through the contested
grounds of ideologies, namely those of a post-soviet state and those of modern Eu-
ropean nations. On the one hand, with the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007
∗Joint with Richard Paap, Jean-Marie Viaene and Olga Zelenko. Published as a Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper, 16-057/VI, 2016.
1Though country membership in CIS varied over time, our definition includes the 12 countries
that were members in 1993, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Georgia joined in 1993 but
quit in 2009. Turkmenistan was a member throughout 1991-2004.
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the borders of the European Union (EU) came closer to Ukraine, making the EU
a potentially more important trading partner. On the other hand, pro-soviet gov-
ernments ratified numerous bilateral agreements between subsets of CIS countries
in search of deeper integration. However, by bringing down their president in win-
ter 2013, the Maidan revolution prevented the planned membership of Ukraine in
the customs union initially founded by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2007.
The revolution, however, did not renege other regional trading agreements already
in place. In contrast, it prompted the signing of the so-called Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 2014 as a new source of prosperity.
Therefore, the question of what deeper economic ties with the Western nations may
bring to Ukraine takes considerable importance. Particularly, what are the factors
suggesting that deeper economic integration of Ukraine with the EU may well out-
weigh the benefits from further advancement of economic ties with the rest of CIS?
The objective of this chapter is to address these trade-offs empirically by focusing
on the trade implications of alternative policy choices.2
Several other aspects that characterize Ukraine’s evolution are considered here as
well. First, the quality of infrastructure is important in the determination of trade
flows (Francois and Manchin, 2013; Grigoriou, 2007; Shepherd and Wilson, 2009)
in that it can effectively lower the distance between two even geographically dis-
tant countries. Second, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) show that inclusive political
institutions that support inclusive economic institutions are more likely to lead to
prosperity. It is the connection between political and economic institutions which
can explain why otherwise similar-looking countries might differ in terms of economic
performance. In addition, good institutions as a means of protecting property rights
promote entrepreneurship as they facilitate the adoption and creation of new tech-
nologies (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Also, there is substantial evidence that
the quality of political and economic institutions matters for trade. For example,
Cuñat and Melitz (2010, 2012) focus on labor market regulations and show the role
2Though the analysis of this chapter considers trade flows, the latter are closely linked to the
growth experience of countries. For example, Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) describe 176
studies that use a reduced form relationship between openness and economic growth. Most of
the studies they review find a positive relationship between trade volumes and growth. Equally
important is the abundance of studies that test for the positive role of FDI on country’s growth.
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of labor market flexibility as a source of comparative advantage. Levchenko (2004)
studies the quality of institutions (like the imperfect recognition of property rights,
the quality of contract enforcement, etc.) and shows how it affects trade flows and
the distribution of gains between rich and poor countries. In Nunn (2007), Costinot
(2009) and others, institutional differences across countries have consequences not
only for aggregate productivity but also for productivity differences across industries
within a single country. Altogether it is not surprising that democratic values and,
in particular, a war on corruption3 matter for the establishment of closer ties with
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU. In this analysis, we use indica-
tors to quantify the effects of governance and infrastructure on trade and address
the following questions: (i) Would the improvement of governance and infrastruc-
ture yield a significant positive impact on Ukraine’s trade? (ii) How large are these
effects in comparison to traditional benefits, if any, of standard trade policies like
regional trade agreements?
We estimate gravity models of trade using an unbalanced panel data set that
consists of bilateral export flows among world economies. The data covers 159
countries over the period 1997 – 2012 and thus includes the major developments over
the past decades. While the existing literature aims at measuring general effects of
trade policies, this chapter focuses rather on the assessment of counterfactuals using
a novel technique for non-linear scenario analysis that accounts for the intensive and
the extensive margins of trade. Although the analysis can be potentially extended
to any world country, our focus is on Ukraine.
Different econometric techniques have been advanced recently to correct for es-
timation biases that arise from the large number of zero flows typical to bilateral
trade data.4 There are several reasons for the occurrence of zeros. A first cause is
the so-called data coding problem in survey data (Wooldridge, 2002) where some of
the zeros are attributed to the non-reporting of small trade flows. Further, political
conflicts can give rise to the absence of trade between different subsets of countries.
3On the dynamics of corruption in Ukraine see The Economist (Sep 26, 2015; pp. 23-24).
4Together with the decomposition of aggregate exports into the extensive/intensive margins,
Head and Mayer (2014) consider the econometric treatment of zero trade flows to be another topic
at the frontier of current research. As section 4.4 will show both topics are related.
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For example, there is no trade between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to their conflict
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.5 Finally, with sunk entry and sunk exit costs in
export markets it might be optimal for exporting firms not to export as it has been
shown in the hysteresis literature (see, e.g. Dixit, 1992) and the firm heterogeneity
literature (see, e.g. Helpman et al., 2008). In this chapter we use recent estimation
techniques that take into account zeros in trade. Our approach is then to select
between rival models using statistical tools for model selection like the Vuong test.
Our empirical results convincingly support: (i) higher values for exports between
CIS countries; (ii) a positive effect of WTO membership on trade of the order of
24-40%; (iii) significant positive effects of improved institutions and infrastructure.
For Ukraine scenario-based estimates of the effects of improved institutions on trade
are about 98%, those of improved infrastructure are about 22%.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant
economic indicators for Ukraine. Section 4.3 discusses the modelling approach, the
data and the results. Section 4.4 uses estimation results to compute counterfactuals
and assess potential effects of improved governance and improved infrastructure on
Ukraine’s export flows. Section 4.5 addresses the policy relevance of our results.
Section 4.6 concludes. Appendix 4.A describes the data methods and sources, in-
cludes the list of countries in our panel, provides details on the estimation of relevant
models and describes the algorithms used for the analysis of counterfactuals.
4.2 Trade and Economic Development Patterns in
Ukraine
Ukraine has undergone a difficult and lengthy transition from a planned to a market
economy.6 Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 the country had
experienced steeply declining real economic activity for eight years. Although the
5In contrast, trade transactions did not stop after the armed conflict between Georgia and
Russia.
6This is regardless of its high economic potential. For example, the large and educated popu-
lation of the country, availability of natural resources, favourable geographic position between the
East and the West. In 1990 62% of Ukraine’s adult population had at least secondary degree (see
Barro and Lee, 2014) and this percentage has increased over time.
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trend reversed since then Ukraine’s real output in 2014 was yet lower than its level
24 years ago. This is in contrast to growth experience of any other CIS economy.7
Ukraine is currently a lower-middle-income economy according to the World Bank
classification.
Income inequality, however, has decreased since mid-1990s. The most recent
GINI coefficient for Ukraine is 28.2% which is lower than the average value of the
remaining CIS countries (see Table 4.1). The summary of selected indicators in
Table 4.1 also shows that Ukraine is an outward oriented economy. Trade openness
Table 4.1: Trade and economic development indicators in Ukraine, EU-15 and CIS.
Indicator Ukraine EU-15 EU-27
CIS
(excl.
Ukraine)
GNI per capita (PPP, 2011 international $) 10055 39684 32551 10872
GINI coefficient (%) 28.2 29.4 30.0 33.9
Governance (average score) -0.72 1.32 1.06 -0.80
Logistics performance index 2.7 3.9 3.5 2.4
Trade openness (%) 77.0 63.3 66.7 46.4
Tariff (%) 2.6 2.4 2.4 6.8
Percentage of WTO members 100 100 100 50
Number of regional trade agreements (average) 16 35 35 7
Source: World Bank, CIA Factbook, WTO.
Notes: (i) EU-15 includes 15 economies that joined the EU before 1996. EU-27 includes 27
economies that joined the EU before 2008. CIS (excl. Ukraine) refers to 10 CIS economies: Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan; (ii) The data refers to year 2013 for all indicators except the logistics
performance index (2012 data) and the GINI coefficient (2005-2013 data); (iii) Governance is
the average score of 6 World Bank WGI indicators that range from -2.5=low to 2.5=high (see
Appendix 4.A.2 for more details); (iv) Logistics performance is the World Bank index that mea-
sures the quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure (ranges from 1=low to 5=high);
(v) Trade openness is the sum of regional merchandise exports and imports divided by regional
GDP, all in current US$; (vi) Tariff is the average of effectively applied tariff rates weighted by
the product import shares.
measured by trade-to-GDP is 77%. The indicator is considerably higher than the
CIS average of 46%. The country is also a WTO member since 2008 and on average
participates in 16 RTAs. Furthermore, it applies an average tariff rate of 2.6%,
which is similar in value to that of the EU while it is considerably lower than the
7Similar performance can only be observed for Moldova where real GDP in 2014 has also been
lower than in 1991.
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tariff rate applied by the rest of CIS. Trade, however, is hampered by a relatively
poor quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure. The World Bank logistics
performance index rates Ukraine 2.7 on the scale from 1 to 5 (see Table 4.1).
Concerning trading partners, Ukraine trades a similar amount with the CIS free
trade area (CISFTA) as it does with the EU (Figure 4.1). In 2013 trade with CISFTA
constituted 30.6% of total Ukrainian trade. Most of it (89.3%) is Ukraine’s trade
with Russian Federation, which is Ukraine’s largest single country trading partner.
Trade with CISFTA is certainly facilitated by a common historical past with CIS,
common borders with Belarus, Moldova and Russia and a common language shared
by significant parts of Ukrainian population. Nevertheless, the share of Ukrainian
trade with the EU is close in value. Main goods exported to the EU are raw materials,
chemical products and machinery while main imported goods include machinery,
transport equipment, chemicals, and manufactured goods.8 Thus, both EU-27 and
CISFTA are important country’s trading partners although it is evident from Figure
4.1 that the share of CISFTA has been on a steady decline since 2011.
An aspect of great importance for Ukraine to establish closer ties with the EU
is the quality of institutions. Currently Ukraine performs considerably poorer than
the EU. The average score on the quality of governance is low and similar in value
to that of CIS (see Table 4.1). A particularly low score is on control of corruption.
Corruption is perceived to be extensive in the Ukraine’s public sector. The country
scores −1.09 in 2013 on the scale of −2.5 (high corruption) to 2.5 (low). According
to Transparency International the country ranks 142 out of 174 world countries in
the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. The rule of law indicator is also low9 and
reveals limited confidence in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
courts and police. Clearly, corruption and weak regulations are deterrents to trade
and foreign investment. Importantly, however, a pro-European choice of the foreign
policies of Ukraine would certainly help to bring its current governance scores to a
higher level.
8See http://ec.europa.eu/.
9The score is −0.83 in 2013.
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Figure 4.1: Ukraine’s trade with EU-27 and CISFTA.
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF DOTS.
Notes: (i) Other countries include mainly China, Turkey and
Egypt; (ii) CISFTA consists of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
4.3 Model Selection, Estimation and Results
We analyze Ukraine’s trade flows in a gravity model framework. Gravity equation is
the result of the most modern microfounded trade models. It has been obtained in
the literature that assumes product differentiation and imperfect competition (An-
derson, 1979; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Bergstrand, 1989; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003), in the literature that builds on perfect competition and technologi-
cal differences (Eaton and Kortum, 2002) and in the literature that builds on perfect
competition and complete specialization (Deardorff, 1998). The equation takes the
following functional form:
Xijt = YitYjt
τ 1−σijt
Σit∆jt
, (4.1)
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where Xijt is a measure of nominal trade between two countries i and j at time t. In
this chapter we measure trade by export flows from exporting country i to importing
country j. To estimate the parameters of the gravity model, we use an unbalanced
panel of annual bilateral export flows between 159 countries and 155 trading partners
over 1997–2012. Altogether the included countries cover over 94% of reported world
exports in 2012. Variables Yit and Yjt capture the sizes of the trading partners.
We use exporting and importing country’s gross domestic products as proxies for
Yit and Yjt. The term τijt denotes trade costs between the two countries. The
costs include transportation costs (e.g., distance and infrastructure), information
and search costs (e.g., common language, common historical ties) and a variety of
trade policy measures (e.g. tariff rates, membership in WTO, free trade areas or
customs unions) that either lower or raise the costs associated with trade. The two
terms in the denominator Σit and ∆jt are additional terms that vary over time and
at country i and country j level, respectively. In Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
for example, these are the terms that capture multilateral price resistance and in
Head and Mayer (2014) the different ways to proxy these multilateral resistance
terms are listed and reviewed. Table 4.2 itemizes the variables included into final
model specifications. More details on the included countries and the data sources
can be found in Appendices 4.A.1 and 4.A.2, respectively.
4.3.1 Zeros in Trade
On average around one forth of country pairs in the world exhibit zero trade (see
Table 4.3). Although the number of trading country pairs is declining over time
and each year more and more countries engage into trade, accounting for zeros
is important to avoid possibly biased inference (see, e.g., Helpman et al., 2008).
Zeros occur for a variety of reasons. It may be that trade between two specific
countries is small and therefore appears as null in reported data due to rounding.
Alternatively, it may be that countries do not trade indeed either because of political
conflicts or because firms find it optimal not to trade. Melitz (2003), in fact, explains
emergence of zero trade flows as a result of firms’ self-selection into exporters and
non-exporters. As also in later trade models with self-selection (Bernard et al., 2007;
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Table 4.2: Explanatory variables included in the final model specifications.
Notation Variable
lnGDPit
log of GDP of exporting country i in current million US dollars at time
t
lnGDPjt
log of GDP of importing country j in current million US dollars at time
t
effdistijt
effective (corrected for infrastructure) distance between countries i and
j at time t
tariffjt average tariff rate in percent applied by importing country j at time t
govit
average score on six World Bank governance indicators for exporting
country i at time t
govjt
average score on six World Bank governance indicators for importing
country j at time t
WTOijt 1 when both countries i and j are WTO members at time t
0 otherwise
EUijt 1 when both countries i and j are EU members at time t
0 otherwise
CUBKRijt
1 when both countries i and j are members of the customs union between
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia at time t
0 otherwise
EUFTAijt
1 when country i is an EU country and country j has an FTA with EU
at time t and vice versa
0 otherwise
CISijt 1 when both countries i and j belong to CIS at time t
0 otherwise
languageij
1 when a common language is spoken by at least 9% of the population
in countries i and j
0 otherwise
adjacentij 1 when countries i and j share a common border
0 otherwise
religionij religion similarity between country i and j
Note: See Appendix 4.A.2 for more details on data sources and methods.
Chaney, 2008; Arkolakis, 2011) firms decide whether to export based on fixed costs
of trade that need to be carried on. As a result zero trade in the exporting country
is observed when no firms find it profitable to carry on the fixed costs. Depending
on the source of zeros, different econometric methods are applicable to estimate the
parameters in (4.1). In this chapter we use the three most commonly encountered
techniques: Heckman two-stage procedure (Heckman, 1979), Eaton-Tamura tobit
(Eaton and Tamura, 1994) and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) (Santos
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Table 4.3: Occurence of zero trade flows.
Year
Number of country
pairs with positive
export flows
Number of country
pairs with zero
export flows
Zero export flows
(%)
1997 10633 4204 28.3
1998 11183 4307 27.8
1999 12010 4100 25.5
2000 12571 4777 27.5
2001 13898 5481 28.3
2002 14731 5776 28.2
2003 14993 5557 27.0
2004 15270 5390 26.1
2005 15830 5075 24.3
2006 16152 4679 22.5
2007 16328 4536 21.7
2008 15997 4371 21.5
2009 15602 3998 20.4
2010 13203 3198 19.5
2011 10359 2280 18.0
2012 9668 2054 17.5
Source: Own caclulations based on IMF DOTS.
Notes: (i) Calculations are based on nominal bilateral export flows in US dollars; (ii) Country
pairs with reported missing export values were omitted.
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).10 The first two - Heckman two-stage procedure and
Eaton-Tamura tobit - are directly built under the assumption that firms self-select
into export markets. Both models allow to carry out an extensive comparative
statics in that both intensive and extensive margins of trade can be computed. The
latter - PPML - is an alternative to self-selection models. It accounts for zero trade
flows assuming that zeros occur at random. An advantage of using PPML is that
it eliminates the bias that arises due to the log-linearization of trade flows in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. However, unlike, for example, the Heckman model,
PPML postulates identical data generating processes for trading and non-trading
country-pairs.
As selecting from the three types of specification is difficult due to the different
10Other methods are available as well, e.g., negative binomial, but they are generally special
cases or extensions of the models discussed in this section and are significantly less encountered in
empirical literature.
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distributional assumptions, we apply in this chapter all three specifications and
compare the implied results from the models. We however perform a model selection
procedure within each model family to select the proper specification of intercepts
and explanatory variables.
4.3.2 Model Specification and Selection
Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) assumes that whether two specific countries en-
gage into trade is determined by a latent variable Zijt (propensity to trade). This
unobserved factor linearly depends on a vector of explanatory variables Wᵀijt:
Zijt = W
′
ijtβ + ijt,1, (4.2)
where ijt,1 ∼ NID(0, 1) and the parameter vector β describes the effect of the
explanatory variables on the propensity to trade. As long as the propensity to trade
is positive, positive trade flows are observed. Otherwise, trade flows are zero:
X∗ijt =
 1 if Zijt > 00 if Zijt ≤ 0 . (4.3)
Here X∗ijt is a binary variable that is 0 for country pairs with zero bilateral trade
and 1 otherwise. When X∗ijt = 1 positive trade flows Xijt are observed. It is then
possible to take the log of the gravity equation (4.1) which gives a log-log relationship
between existing trade and its determinants:
lnXijt = V
′
ijtα + ηit + ηjt + ijt,2, (4.4)
where V′ijt = (lnYit, lnYjt, ln τijt)ᵀ, ηit = − ln Σit and ηjt = − ln ∆jt and where ijt,2
is an error term potentially correlated with ijt,1. The parameters of (4.4) can be
estimated using ordinary least squares after accounting for the correlation between
ijt,1 and ijt,2 (see Appendix 4.A.3). In some studies, the term ηit + ηjt is replaced
by ηi + ηj + ηt.
Just as in the Heckman model, bilateral exportsXijt in Eaton-Tamura framework
(Eaton and Tamura, 1994) are determined by the latent propensity to trade Zijt.
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As long as it is positive, positive trade flows between two countries are observed:
Xijt =
 Zijt if Zijt > 00 if Zijt ≤ 0 .
In Eaton-Tamura model the latent variable Zijt is defined as
ln(Zijt + at) = V
′
ijtα + ηi + ηj + ηt + uijt (4.5)
with uijt ∼ NID(0, σ2). It is clear from (4.5) that the right hand side has to reach
a certain time-varying threshold level ln at before actual trade takes place. This is a
typical outcome of oligopoly models of trade where entry sunk costs must be covered
before profitable trade transactions can be established. The possibility to estimate
this threshold is clearly an advantage of this method. To capture possible deviations
from homoskedasticity in the error term of (4.5) we follow Martin and Pham (2015)
and we replace σ by σijt and let it depend on regressors in the following manner:
σijt = ξ + δ
(
V′ijtα + ηi + ηj + ηt
)
.
To estimate the parameters we can use maximum likelihood approach, see again
Appendix 4.A.3 for details.
Estimation of trade elasticities by using a log-log functional form as in Heckman
has its limitations. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that when errors are
heteroskedastic the log-log specification of the gravity equation leads to biased pa-
rameter estimates due to Jensen’s inequality. We therefore follow the authors and as
a yet another estimation method use PPML to overcome potential bias. The method
is essentially Non-Linear Least Squares when the conditional variance of trade flows
V ar(Xijt|V′ijt) is proportional to the conditional mean E(Xijt|V′ijt):
Xijt = e
V′ijtα+ηi+ηj+ηt + νijt. (4.6)
Details on parameter estimation can be found in Appendix 4.A.3. Besides accounting
for the bias associated with Jensen’s inequality, the method does not pose restrictions
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to the inclusion of zero trade country-pairs and, in addition, it does not specify the
distribution of νijt.
All three methods allow for a large range of specifications of the deterministics
and the inclusion of explanatory variables. Some authors opt for country-pair fixed
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in country pairs (e.g., Cheng and
Wall, 2005). Others employ country fixed effects (e.g. Mátyás, 1997; Egger, 2000).
Yet others estimate time-varying country fixed effects or a combination of those (e.g.,
Baltagi et al., 2003). Furthermore, the use of both nominal and real trade data is
common. Although the gravity equation is a demand function in value terms Glick
and Rose (2002), Baltagi et al. (2003) among others choose to use real trade flows in
their empirical studies. In this case, however, the way nominal bilateral trade flows
are deflated to obtain real data is important as this may well affect the accuracy of
estimates when panel data is used (see, e.g., the bronze medal mistake in Baldwin
and Taglioni, 2007).
In this chapter we do not choose a particular specification but instead let the
data choose between alternative models using statistical tests. This allows us to
directly address the following important choices that have to be made in the em-
pirical analysis of trade flows: (i) What is the best specification of fixed effects to
capture unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral trade? Should the correct empirical
specification of gravity equation include time-varying country effects directly pre-
scribed by economic theory? (ii) How do gravity models of trade with nominal
variables compare to gravity models of trade with real variables? Should nominal
gravity model specifications be preferred? (iii) Is bilateral trade data character-
ized by homoskedasticity? Do models that allow for heteroskedastic errors perform
equally well to models that assume error homoskedasticity? We address all these
questions in our empirical analysis.
To select the proper model specification we use statistical tests. When two rival
models are nested we apply a regular log-likelihood test. When the two are non-
nested we proceed with the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989; Clarke, 2007). The Vuong
test cannot be applied for PPML and Heckman models as parameter estimation in
these models does not involve a full maximum likelihood approach. However, for
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the choice of nominal and, separately, real variables, we still apply the Vuong test in
the Heckman model using the likelihood of the second stage. This approach seems
reasonable as the first step estimation results are identical irrespective of the fixed
effects specification in the second step. In the case of PPML we compare and report
the results of all model specifications. To investigate the difference in coefficients we
also report the results of truncated PPML models that are estimated using a subset
of positive trade flows.
4.3.3 Empirical Results
We estimate the parameters of the three families of gravity specifications, that is,
the Heckman specification, the Eaton-Tamura framework and the PPML approach.
Within each family we select the best model specification as discussed in the previous
section. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 4.4 provide the parameters estimates for three
possible specifications of the Heckman model using nominal data. The Vuong test
indicates that the model with country-pair and time fixed effects is significantly
better than the other two specifications, see the first panel of Table 4.5. This also
holds for the case where we use real data instead of nominal data. The parameters
estimates for the real specification are given in Table 4.A.2.
For the Eaton-Tamura framework we consider specifications with time-invariant
and time-variant entry costs, homoskedastic and heteroskedastic errors and nominal
and real variables. Statistical tests indicate that the Martin-Pham specification with
time-varying entry costs at is preferred, see third panel of Table 4.5. The nominal
Martin-Pham model with time-variant entry costs significantly outperforms 6 out
of 7 or 86% of its competitors in pairwise model comparisons. The same holds for
its real counterpart. Parameter estimates of this specification can be found in the
final column of Table 4.4 for the nominal specification and Table 4.A.2 for the real
specification, respectively.
The estimation results for the PPML specification can be found in Table 4.6
for the nominal specification. We consider both a country-pair, time fixed effects
specification as well as an individual-country effect in combination with a time effect
specification. Furthermore, we also consider the truncated version of the PPML. As
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Table 4.4: Estimates of the gravity model using alternative estimation techniques.
Martin-Pham,
Heckman time-varying
entry costs
first step second step
1Exportijt>0 lnExportijt lnExportijt lnExportijt Exportijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnGDPit 0.30∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
lnGDPjt 0.30∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
effdistijt -0.51∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗
tariffjt 0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
govit 0.33∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
govjt 0.09∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
WTOijt 0.22∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
EUijt -0.58∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
CUBKRijt -3.45∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -4.30∗∗∗
EUFTAijt 0.05∗ 0.00 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
CISijt 1.73∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 3.11∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
languageij 0.42∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
adjacentij 0.11∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗
religionij 0.06∗∗∗
inverseMillsijt 1.42∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
constant -1.85∗∗∗ -8.15∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗
Fixed effects ij, t i, j, t it, jt i, j, t
Number of obs 288211 218428 218428 218428 288211
R-squared 0.34 0.90 0.74 0.75
Notes: (i) Dependent variables in the third row; (ii) *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10%,
5% and 1% levels respectively; (iii) Robust standard errors; (iv) R-squared is computed as a squared
correlation between a dependent variable and fitted values.
the estimation approaches are not likelihood based it is impossible to use the Vuong
test for non-nested model comparison.
We focus the discussion of parameter interpretation on models with nominal
variables. The results for the real variables are rather similar. We obtain robust
(with respect to model specification) and theory-consistent outcomes for a number
of variables. In line with existing literature we obtain significant positive effects of
GDPs on trade and significant negative effects of the effective distance. Tariff rate
also affects trade adversely although it does not seem to impact the probability of
trade. Robust positive effects on trade are found via improved governance. In all
the model specifications in Table 4.4 governance indicators enter equations positively
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Table 4.5: Model performance relative to the performance of competing models.
Model A
Fixed
effects
specifi-
cation
Variables
Number
of com-
peting
models
Percentage
of times
model
A is
(strictly)
preferred
Heckman i, j, t nominal 2 50%
Heckman ij, t nominal 2 100%
Heckman it, jt nominal 2 0%
Heckman i, j, t real 2 50%
Heckman ij, t real 2 100%
Heckman it, jt real 2 0%
Eaton-Tamura with time-invariant entry costs i, j, t nominal 7 14%
Eaton-Tamura with time-variant entry costs i, j, t nominal 7 29%
Martin-Pham with time-invariant entry costs i, j, t nominal 7 71%
Martin-Pham with time-variant entry costs i, j, t nominal 7 86%
Eaton-Tamura with time-invariant entry costs i, j, t real 7 0%
Eaton-Tamura with time-variant entry costs i, j, t real 7 29%
Martin-Pham with time-invariant entry costs i, j, t real 7 57%
Martin-Pham with time-variant entry costs i, j, t real 7 86%
Notes: Competing models can be found in each panel. For example, Heckman model with i, j, t fixed
effects and nominal variables competes with two models: nominal Heckman models with ij, t and
nominal Heckman model with it, jt fixed effects.
and significantly. We also obtain robust results on a number of trade agreements
relevant for Ukraine. The membership of two countries in CIS free trade area shows
a relatively strong positive coefficient in all the model specifications suggesting that
CIS countries trade with each other more than a gravity model would predict. Con-
versely, membership in the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia does
not seem to lead to higher trade flows even though we included anticipation effects
since 2007. Negative coefficients are found in all the model specifications suggesting
that the customs union members overtrade with each other under the CIS agreement.
Finally, common language and WTO membership are found to promote trade. The
latter effect is approximately of order of 24-40% all else equal and assuming constant
inverse Mills coefficient.
While most of the variables take expected signs and, in addition, similar mag-
nitudes across different specifications, the effect of EU agreements on trade is not
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as stable as expected. Estimates of EU and EUFTA dummies do not only change
significance, but also change their sign under different specifications and under some
specifications suggest that EU members trade less with each other than non-EU
member states. Several observations might explain why these results occur. First,
our sample is limited to 1997 - 2012, which means that only the countries that
entered EU in 2004 and 2007 contribute to the estimation of the effect. The con-
tribution of older members is absorbed by fixed effects. Thus, the effect might well
be underestimated. Second, many countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007
have previously had special trade agreements with the union and therefore the EU
dummy may be in principle unable to capture the true effect. Third, integration
efforts among non-EU economies may have had an even larger effect on their trade
so that the gains from the EU agreement may have been relatively more moderate.
Nevertheless, abstracting from possible limitations of using the EU dummy, we do
not find robust evidence with respect to EU or EUFTA membership. The effects are
null or negative in Heckman specifications while positive in PPML. Based on this,
therefore, we cannot conclude that direct gains from the creation of a trade agree-
ment with EU will be positive and significant. Large and significant gains, however,
are expected indirectly, via improved governance and improved infrastructure, the
coefficients of which are robust and signed as expected throughout all the model
specifications.
We note that the effect of the governance of the exporting country appears to
be insignificant in the PPML specification of the gravity equation (see Table 4.6).
However, we question the validity of PPML estimates since the results obtained
using a full data sample are almost identical to those obtained using a truncated
sample that only includes positive trade observations (see columns (3) and (4) of
Table 4.6). This is in conflict with the outcome of Heckman models where non-zero
trade observations have been found to significantly impact the results.
An interesting outcome of our analysis are the estimates of the entry costs in
Eaton-Tamura and Martin-Pham model specifications. Figure 4.2 shows the dy-
namics of estimated initial costs. The results capture well the decreasing trend in
global entry costs since 1997 and point to an increase in costs during the 2008/2009
96
Table 4.6: Estimates of the gravity model using alternative estimation techniques.
PPML Truncated PPML
Exportijt Exportijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPit 0.69∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
lnGDPjt 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
effdistijt -0.48∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.79∗∗∗
tariffjt -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
govit 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
govjt 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
WTOijt 0.23∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
EUijt 0.24∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
CUBKRijt -0.65∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗
EUFTAijt 0.04 0.25∗∗∗ 0.04 0.25∗∗∗
CISijt 0.35∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 1.66∗∗
languageij 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
adjacentij 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
Fixed effects ij, t i, j, t ij, t i, j, t
Number of obs 266592 288211 217650 218438
Notes: (i) All the variables are in nominal terms; (ii) Dependent variables in the second row; (iii) *,
**, *** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; (iv) Robust standard
errors.
recession.
Finally, in estimating gravity equations there is a concern of possible endogeneity
of trade agreement variables. The decision on whether to form a free trade agreement
is unlikely to be independent of the initial trade level between countries. However,
the fixed effects included in our models should if not eliminate then at least lower the
possible endogeneity bias by capturing differences in initial trade levels. Moreover,
the variety of fixed effects deals well with possible endogeneity that may stem from
unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. non-tariff measures specific to each country pair or
domestic regulations that control international trade).
In the next section we perform several scenario analyses based on the estimation
results. As the models with real dependent variable show similar results, we only
focus on nominal models. Based on the test results, we consider for these analyses
the Heckman model with ηij, ηt fixed effects, the Martin-Pham model with time-
variant entry costs at and the PPML.
97
Figure 4.2: Entry costs estimated by Eaton-Tamura and Martin-Pham specifications.
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Note: Estimated coefficient at in (4.5) expressed in US dollars.
4.4 Scenario Analyses
Model estimates in Table 4.4 lead to a set of robust results for a number of key
variables. However, estimated elasticities do not necessarily represent the entire
effect of those variables on export flows. Inference based on elasticities assumes
that, for example, in a Heckman model, the Mills ratio does not play a role as a
policy variable of interest changes. In this section we perform scenario analyses
where we account for changes in the inverse Mills ratio.
For the scenario analyses, we use the fitted values of the models to quantify a
number of counterfactuals. Particularly, we consider the following three questions:
(i) what are the trade gains that are expected to accrue to Ukraine as it gains the
EU access via a free trade area agreement compared to those of being a member of
the customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia? (ii) how would the trade
pattern of Ukraine change if its level of infrastructure were to improve to reach the
average value of EU-15? (iii) what would be the level of trade of Ukraine if it were
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to adopt the governance quality of Western economies?
As discussed at the end of the previous section, we consider the three best per-
forming models selected in the previous section and we focus on the evolution at
two margins: the intensive margin and the extensive margin. The intensive margin
refers to a variation in the amount of trade of exporting firms that have already
entered the foreign market. The extensive margin instead refers to trade that is
created because new firms that did not export before enter the foreign market. We
refer to Appendix 4.A.5 for computational details.
The estimated coefficient of the EUFTAijt dummy takes a significant negative
value of αˆEUFTA = −0.27 in the Martin-Pham specification of Table 4.4, a null
value in the Heckman specification with country-pair and time fixed effects and a
significant positive value of αˆEUFTA = 0.25 in the PPML specification with country
specific fixed effects of Table 4.6. There is therefore not enough evidence to verify the
null hypothesis that trade between countries that have a free trade agreement with
the EU is in line with gravity model predictions. There is not only lack of consensus
on the significance, but neither it is on the sign of the effect. We approximate the
bilateral EUFTAijt effect by eαˆEUFTA − 1 and report it as an entry of the second
column of Table 4.7. Similarly in the third column we obtain marginal trade effects
of the customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. These are negative
according to all model estimates. The results of Table 4.7 therefore point to an
ambiguous effect of the free trade area with the EU and to a negative effect of the
customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.
Table 4.7: Marginal trade effects of policy changes.
Model
Free trade
agreement with EU
(EUFTAijt)
Customs union with
Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Russia
(CUBKRijt)
Heckman with ij, t fixed effects 0.00% -69.58%
Martin-Pham, time-varying entry costs -23.66% -98.64%
PPML with i, j, t fixed effects 28.40% -42.88%
Note: The effects in Heckman model are computed conditional on trade being positive.
Trade benefits, however, are not limited to traditional policy instruments like
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the establishment of free trade areas. The effects may be indirect and play a role
via improved infrastructure or improved governance. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate
the results. Scenario analyses are performed in few steps. First, governance (resp.
infrastructure) is lifted to the EU-15 average in 2012. In this specific case Ukrainian
governance is lifted from -0.57 to 1.31 and Ukrainian infrastructure is lifted from 2.69
to 3.85. This changes the model predicted probability of positive trade between a pair
of countries. The difference in this probability averaged across all export destinations
of Ukraine is then reported in column (1) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9. This outcome
represents the extensive margin in probability terms. Namely, the percentage of all
bilateral export flows that are no longer zero as a result of the policy change. Further,
the intensive margin is obtained by computing the effect of the policy change on Xijt
while conditioning on Xijt > 0 and while accounting for the change in the Mills ratio.
The average of percentage changes across all export destinations gives then column
(2) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9. Further as a next step the total effect of the policy change
on Xijt is computed, i.e. when we do not condition on Xijt > 0. Again, the average
of percentage changes across all export destinations gives then the total effect of
the policy change on bilateral export flows after a correction has been made for the
sample selection bias. This corresponds to column (4) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9. Finally,
the difference between the total effect and the intensive margin gives column (2), i.e.
the extent of the extensive margin in value terms. The exact formulas are available
in Appendix 4.A.5.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show robust outcomes, particularly with respect to the im-
provement in infrastructure. The results suggest that on average across all the three
models the total effect of improving Ukraine’s infrastructure to the EU-15 level would
lead to a 22.31% increase in country’s exports. Most of this increase originates from
the intensive margin of trade. The last column of Table 4.9 also indicates that the
impact of improved governance on Ukraine’s exports can be as large as 126.54%
following the results of the Heckman model. Martin-Pham model estimates deliver
a lower gain while PPML suggests that the gain is insignificant. The latter result,
however, is questionable as it conflicts with the results of all the remaining models
and it does not seem to account well for zeros in trade.
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Table 4.8: Trade effects of improved infrastructure.
Model
Exten-
sive
Margin:
Change
in Prob-
ability
(%)
Exten-
sive
Margin:
Change
in
Export
Flows
(%)
Intensive
Margin:
Change
in
Export
Flows
(%)
Total
Country
Exports:
Change
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman with ij, t fixed effects 1.34 1.66 14.80 16.47
Martin-Pham, time-varying entry costs 0.54 0.58 33.44 34.02
PPML with i, j, t fixed effects – – – 16.43
Table 4.9: Trade effects of improved governance.
Model
Exten-
sive
Margin:
Change
in Prob-
ability
(%)
Exten-
sive
Margin:
Change
in
Export
Flows
(%)
Intensive
Margin:
Change
in
Export
Flows
(%)
Total
Country
Exports:
Change
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman with ij, t fixed effects 6.23 12.80 113.73 126.54
Martin-Pham, time-varying entry costs 0.81 1.02 67.93 68.96
PPML with i, j, t fixed effects – – – 6.21
4.5 Policy Relevance
Our empirical results enable to establish a hierarchy of policies. Estimated models
suggest that most of the gains can be realized through improved governance. In our
computations of counterfactuals we find that lifting governance of Ukraine to the
EU-15 level would, all else equal, provide trade gains of around 98% on average.
To a lesser extent but nevertheless significant is the quality of infrastructure that,
according to our counterfactuals, could lead to on average 22% increase in Ukrainian
exports if lifted to the EU-15 level. Significant trade benefits are associated with
a WTO membership (approximately 24-40%). Thus, directions for changes at the
country level require commitment from Ukraine to increase the quality of its gov-
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ernance and infrastructure. Furthermore, the analysis provides evidence that, net
of significant positive effects from reduced tariff rates, relatively small gains are ex-
pected from regional trading agreements. Our analysis suggests that access to the
EU does not bring additional significant effects. Also, no positive trade boost was
found resulting from the customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. It
is questionable whether such a customs union will ever lead to positive trade effects
since we find that CIS countries still substantially over-trade with each other. Not
much has been said regarding the costs of implementing these policies. For example,
an improvement in infrastructure requires large investments. However, the policy
with the largest trade effects at both margins, namely, improved governance seems
the cheapest to implement in economic terms.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed alternative trade policy options for Ukraine. We focused
on two scenarios. The first scenario evaluated possible consequences for Ukraine
of closer economic integration with the EU (West). The second assessed possible
outcomes of further integration with the CIS (East). Our results suggest that CIS
countries significantly overtrade with each other. We find that yet closer ties of
Ukraine with CIS via, for example, granted access to the customs union of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Russian Federation, would not bring additional trade benefits. We
also find no robust results emerging from the establishment of a free trade area
agreement with the EU. The models deliver conflicting evidence. However, our
results point to robust and significant indirect trade effects that would accrue to
Ukraine from closer economic ties with the EU. In particular, we find that Ukraine’s
governance improved to the EU-15 level could lead to trade gains of order of 98%
while improved infrastructure could lead to lower, yet significant, 22%. Closer ties
with the EU would certainly help to bring Ukraine’s governance and infrastructure
scores to a higher level.
Our analysis was based on the results of the gravity model of trade estimated
using three alternative estimation approaches that account for zeros in trade: Heck-
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man two-stage procedure, Martin-Pham tobit and PPML. We used a panel dataset
of bilateral export flows among 159 world economies to obtain our results. More-
over, our approach included the application of statistical tests to select between
competing models. We drew our conclusions from the non-linear scenario analysis
of counterfactuals based on the results from the best performing models.
Our analysis has also yielded a number of robust results relevant for the general
application of the gravity model of trade. We find that the inclusion of time-varying
fixed effects does not improve the performance of an empirical model due to a large
loss of degrees of freedom. Gravity model of trade that includes importer, exporter
and time fixed effects is sufficient to fit the data. Furthermore, we find that models
with nominal variables perform similarly to models with real variables if fixed effects
are accounted for. Finally, our results show that PPML and truncated PPML yield
almost identical results. This suggests that PPML may not always account well for
the large number of zeros in trade.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Included Countries
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
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Colombia
Comoros
Dem. Rep. of Congo
Rep. of Congo
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Rep. of Korea
Kuwait
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Rep. of Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
4.A.2 Data Sources and Methods
Table 4.A.1: Data definitions and sources.
Variable Description Formula and notes Source
Xijt Exports of country i to country j, f.o.b. value
in million current US dollars
IMF DOTS
xijt Real exports of country i to country j xijt =
Xijt×RGDPit
GDPit
IMF DOTS, World Bank
WDI
GDP·t GDP in million current US dollars World Bank WDI
RGDP·t GDP in million constant 2005 US dollars World Bank WDI
adjacentij Dummy for the common border 1 if countries i and j are contiguous; 0 otherwise CEPII, GeoDist database,
Mayer and Zignano (2011),
variable: contig
languageij Dummy for the common language 1 if common language is spoken at least by 9% of
the population in countries i and j; 0 otherwise
CEPII, GeoDist database,
Mayer and Zignano (2011),
variable: comlang_etno
distanceij Distance between countries i and j in km based
on bilateral distances between the biggest cities
of the two countries with inter-city distances
being weighted by the share of the city in the
overall country’s population
dij =
(∑
k∈i
∑
l∈j
popk
popi
popl
popj
dθkl
)1/θ
, θ = −1 CEPII, GeoDist database,
Mayer and Zignano (2011),
variable: distwces
Continued on next page
Table 4.A.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Description Formula and notes Source
religionij Religion similarity index calculated as the prod-
uct of the ratios for the exporting and import-
ing country of people practising the same re-
ligion to the sum of people practising nine re-
ligions: Anglicanism, Buddhism, Catholicism,
Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Or-
thodoxy and Protestantism
religionij =
∑9
k=1
rki∑9
l=1 rli
rkj∑9
l=1 rlj
, rki - number
of people practising religion k in country i, ranges
from 0 to 1
Own calculations based on
2010 data from World Chris-
tian Database, worldchris-
tiandatabase.org, dataset Re-
ligious makeup by country
infra·t Logistics performance index: quality of trade-
and transport-related infrastructure
ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high) World Bank WDI
effdistijt Effective distance (corrected for infrastructure) effdistijt = ln
(
dij
infrait+infrajt
)
Own calculations
tariffjt Tariff rate of country j, most favoured nation,
weighted mean of all products, %
World Bank WDI
WTOijt Dummy for the WTO membership (country i
and j are both members at time t)
1 if both countries i and j belong to the WTO; 0
otherwise
www.wto.org
EUijt Dummy for the EU membership (country i and
j are both members at time t)
1 if both countries i and j belong to EU; 0 other-
wise
www.europa.eu
CUBKRijt Dummy for the membership in the customs
union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia
(country i and j are both members at time t)
1 if both countries i and j belong to the customs
union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia; 0 oth-
erwise
www.tsouz.ru
Continued on next page
Table 4.A.1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Description Formula and notes Source
EUFTAijt Dummy for an FTA with the EU of country i
and j
1 if country i is an EU country and country j has
an FTA with the EU and vice versa; 0 otherwise
WTO RTA database
CIS Dummy for CIS membership (country i and j
are both members at time t)
1 if both countries i and j belong to CIS; 0 other-
wise
www.cisstat.com
gov·t Average governance score based on: control
of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality,
voice and accountability, government effective-
ness, political stability and absence of violence
gov·t = (cor·t + law·t + reg·t + acc·t + gov·t +
polstab·t)/6, ranges from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high)
Own calculations based on
World Bank WGI database
Notes: (i) Data on infrastructure is available for 2007, 2010 and 2012. Missing data is interpolated using cubic splines and the earliest available data point
(2007 for the majority of contries) was used to extrapolate the data till 1997; (ii) CIS dummy refers to CIS and not necessarily to CISFTA countries; (iii)
For a number of countries missing tariff rate data was interpolated using cubic splines; (iv) The membership in the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Russia is assumed to be in force for the three countries since 2007 to take into account the anticipation effect. The actual enforcement took place in 2011.
This does not bring sinificant changes to the estimated coefficient; (v) Missing data on governance (years 1997, 1999, 2001) is interpolated using cubic splines.
The definitions of the indicators are: (1) Voice and Accountability - capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media; (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism -
capturing perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism; (3) Government Effectiveness - capturing
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies; (4) Regulatory Quality - capturing perceptions of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development; (5) Rule of Law -
capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; (6) Control of Corruption - capturing perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private
interests.
108
4.A.3 Parameter Estimation
In this appendix we provide more details on the parameter estimation methods used in the
chapter.
Heckman Model
To estimate the parameters of the Heckman model (4.2)–(4.4) we use a two-step approach.
In the first step the parameters of a probit model are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The probit model relates the probability of trade between two countries to a set of ex-
planatory variables:
Pr(X∗ijt = 1|Wijt) = Pr(W′ijtβ + ijt,1 > 0) = Φ(W′ijtβ), (4.7)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. In the
second step we consider a linear panel data model explaining existing trade relationships
Xijt > 0 as given in (4.4) where ijt,2 ∼ N(0, σ22) and the correlation between the error
terms of the probit and linear regression is represented by:
E (ijt,1ijt,2) = σ12.
The expected value of lnXijt given that Xijt > 0 is given by:
E(lnXijt|Xijt > 0,Vijt,Wijt) = V′ijtα+ ηit + ηjt + σ12
φ(W′ijtβ)
Φ(W′ijtβ)
,
where φ(·) is the density function of a standard normal distribution. To estimate the
parameters of the linear regression (2nd step), we apply ordinary least squares to the
original regression where we add the inverse Mills ratio
φ(W′ijtβ)
Φ(W′ijtβ)
as an extra explanatory
variable to correct for the correlation between the probit and linear regression:
lnXijt = V
ᵀ
ijtα+ ηit + ηjt + ω
φ(W′ijtβˆ)
Φ(W′ijtβˆ)
+ uijt.
Here βˆ is obtained from the probit regression in the first step. The parameter ωˆ is the
estimate for σ12 and if it is significantly different from zero, the probit equation cannot
be ignored. As the included Mills ratio is based on estimates, the resulting errors of the
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panel regression are heteroskedastic. For correct inference we opt therefore for White
standard errors. Note that the test for ω = 0 relies on regular standard errors as under the
null hypothesis the inverse Mills ratio disappears. For nonparametric identification of the
model parameters, the vector Wijt should include at least one explanatory variable which
is not included in Zijt. This excluded variable is one that is influential in determining the
probability of trade but not the amount of trade. See Wooldridge (2002, Section 17.4) for
more details. We use the religion similarity index for this purpose.
Eaton-Tamura Model
To estimate the parameters of the Eaton-Tamura model (4.5) we use maximum likelihood.
The likelihood function is given by:
L =
∏
i,j,t
[Pr (Xijt = 0) fX (Xijt|Xijt = 0)]1−dijt [Pr (Xijt > 0) fX (Xijt|Xijt > 0)]dijt ,
where dijt is an indicator variable equal to 1 when exports Xijt are positive and 0 otherwise.
Considering that fX (Xijt|Xijt = 0) = 1 and Pr (Xijt = 0) = 1−Φ(Vᵀijtα+ηi+ηj+ηt−ln at)
the log-likelihood simplifies to:
lnL =
∑
i,j,t
[
(1− dijt)
(
1− Φ(Vᵀijtα+ ηi + ηj + ηt − ln at)
)
+ dijt ln (f(Xijt + at))
]
,
(4.8)
where f is a log-normal density function:
f(Xijt + at) =
1
(Xijt + at)
√
2piσ2
e−
1
2σ2
(ln(Xijt+at)−Vᵀijtα−ηi−ηj−ηt)
2
.
To obtain the estimates of at, α and fixed effects ηi, ηj , ηt we maximize (4.8) using the
Newton–Raphson algorithm.
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood
The parameter estimates of the PPML estimator follow from a moment estimator based
on (4.6)
(αˆ, ηˆi, ηˆj , ηˆt)
ᵀ = arg min
α,ηi,ηj ,ηt
∑
i,j,t
(
Xijt − eV
ᵀ
ijtα+ηi+ηj+ηt
)2
,
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The first-order conditions correspond with the first-order conditions of a Poisson model.
The estimator attributes the same weight to all observations. A log-linear specification
gives more weight to observations with high eV
′
ijtα+ηi+ηj+ηt . As long as the pattern of
heteroskedasticity increases with eV
′
ijtα+ηi+ηj+ηt this approach results in a more efficient
estimator as it does not give more weight to "noisier" observations.
The method also overcomes a potential bias arising due to the estimation of elasticities
by using a log-linear form of a gravity equation. The fact stems from Jensen’s inequality
which states that the expectation of the log of the error term is not equal to the log of the
expectation.
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4.A.4 Estimation Results for Real Variables
Table 4.A.2: Estimates of the gravity model using alternative estimation techniques.
Martin-Pham,
Heckman time-varying
entry costs
first step second step
1Exportijt>0 lnExportijt lnExportijt lnExportijt Exportijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnGDPit 0.31∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
lnGDPjt 0.31∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
effdistijt -0.49∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗∗
tariffjt -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.00
govit 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
govjt 0.05∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
WTOijt 0.26∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
EUijt -0.44∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗
CUBKRijt -3.17∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -4.22∗∗∗
EUFTAijt 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
CISijt 1.67∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗
languageij 0.45∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
adjacentij 0.15∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ -0.08∗
religionij 0.05∗∗∗
inverseMillsijt 2.32∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
constant -2.18∗∗∗ -23.17∗∗∗ -4.04∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗
Fixed effects ij, t i, j, t it, jt i, j, t
Number of obs 281255 214461 214461 214461 281255
Notes: (i) All the variables are in real terms; (ii) Dependent variables in the third row; (iii) *, **, ***
denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; (iv) Robust standard errors.
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4.A.5 Computations of the Intensive and Extensive Margins
Besides dealing with zero trade, the Heckman and Eaton-Tamura models provide estimates
of the intensive and extensive margins of trade. The former refers to the change in sales of
incumbent exporters after a policy change, the latter to the change in sales of new entrants.
Heckman Model
Suppose that because of a policy change the kth explanatory variable wk,ijt = vk,ijt ∈
{W′ijt,V′ijt} in (4.2) and/or (4.4) increases from a to b. In the Heckman framework, all
else equal, the policy change transforms the estimated probability of positive trade between
two countries as follows:
Pr(X∗ijt = 1|Wijt)|wk,ijt=b−Pr(X∗ijt = 1|Wijt)|wk,ijt=a = Φ(Wᵀijtβˆ)|wk,ijt=b−Φ(Wᵀijtβˆ)|wk,ijt=a,
where the notation |wijt=a means “evaluate the function at a”. This outcome follows directly
from (4.7). The average across all export destinations of a selected country i (e.g. Ukraine)
represents the extensive margin in probability terms, i.e. the percentage of all potential
bilateral export flows that are no longer zero as a result of the policy change. This result
is shown in column (1) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
The entrance of new exporters11 to the market affects incumbents’ trade flows. This
effect arises in incumbents’ equation (4.4) via the inverse Mills ratio. To estimate this
effect we use conditional expectation, i.e. expected export flow from country i to country
j (in levels) given that there is trade between these two countries:
E(Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt,W′ijt) = exp(Vᵀijtα+ ηit + ηjt + 1/2σ22)
Φ(Wᵀijtβ + σ12)
Φ(W′ijtβ)
.
An intensive margin of trade is then a percentage change in this conditional expectation:
E(Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt,W′ijt)|wk,ijt=b
E(Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt, ,W′ijt)wk,ijt=a
− 1
= exp((b− a)αk)
Φ(W′ijtβ + σ12)|wk,ijt=b
Φ(W′ijtβ)|wk,ijt=b
Φ(W′ijtβ)|wk,ijt=a
Φ(W′ijtβ + σ12)|wk,ijt=a
− 1.
11If the policy change is negative some firms may exit the market giving a negative extensive
margin in probability terms.
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To obtain an estimate we replace model parameters αk, σ12, β with their estimated values
αˆk, ωˆ, βˆ. The average across all export destinations gives then an estimate of the intensive
margin of trade after a correction has been made for the entry of new exporters. We report
the result in column (3) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9. To compute the total (unconditional) change
of the policy change we use the unconditional expectation for export flows in levels given
by:
E(Xijt|V′ijt,W′ijt) = exp(Vᵀijtα+ ηit + ηjt + 1/2σ22)Φ(Wᵀijtβ + σ12).
The unconditional percentage change in the bilateral export flow as a result of the policy
change is then:
E(Xijt|V′ijt,W′ijt)|wk,ijt=b
E(Xijt|V′ijt, ,W′ijt)wk,ijt=a
− 1 = exp((b− a)αk)
Φ(W′ijtβ + σ12)|wk,ijt=b
Φ(W′ijtβ + σ12)|wk,ijt=a
− 1.
Again, we average across all export destinations of Ukraine. This gives the total effect of
the policy change on bilateral trade flows after correction for the sample selection bias. We
report the outcome in column (4) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
The difference between the total change and the intensive margin gives then the extent
of the extensive margin, i.e. the value of exports of newly entered firms. This is column
(2) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
Eaton-Tamura Model
In Eaton-Tamura model (4.5) the effect of policy change on the probability of non zero
trade between two countries is computed as follows:
Pr(Xijt > 0|V′ijt)|vk,ijt=b − Pr(Xijt > 0|V′ijt)|vk,ijt=a
= Φ
(
− ln at −V
′
ijtα− ηi − ηj − ηt
σijt
)∣∣∣∣
vk,ijt=b
−Φ
(
− ln at −V
′
ijtα− ηi − ηj − ηt
σijt
)∣∣∣∣
vk,ijt=a
.
Like in Heckman model the average across all export destinations of a selected country i
gives the extensive margin in probability terms (column (1) of Tables 4.8 and 4.9), where
we replace the parameters with their ML estimates.
From the structure of the Eaton-Tamura model it follows that Qijt = Zijt + at is a
lognormal random variable with the mean µijt = V′ijtα+ ηi+ ηj + ηt and the variance σ
2
ijt.
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This gives the conditional expectation necessary to compute the intensive margin:
E
(
Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt
)
= E(Qijt−at|Qit > at,V′ijt) = exp(µijt+σ2ijt/2)
Φ
(
µijt+σ
2
ijt−ln at
σijt
)
Φ
(
− ln at−µijtσijt
) −at,
and the unconditional expectation relevant for the computation of the total effect of the
policy change:
E(Xijt|V′ijt) = E
(
Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt
)
Pr(Xijt > 0|V′ijt) = E
(
Xijt|Xijt > 0,V′ijt
)×
× Φ
(
− ln at − µijt
σijt
)
.
The intensive margin, the extensive margin in value terms and the total effect of the
policy change are computed in the same way as for the Heckman model using the relevant
conditional and unconditional expectations and the ML parameters estimates.
Chapter 5
Summary and Directions for Further
Research
This thesis has examined three topics relevant for a number of world regions and
economies. Chapter 2 developed a measure of economic integration. By using the
Middle East as an example it argued that measures of economic integration should
take into account not only trade but also the extent of human and physical capital
mobility within the region. Chapter 3 analyzed the effects of global factors on infla-
tion in advanced economies. It focused particularly on the role of global economic
slack, global inflation and commodity prices in driving domestic inflation develop-
ments. Chapter 4 evaluated trade policy options of Ukraine. It analyzed the gains
that Ukraine could benefit from by signing a free trade area agreement with the
European Union. Thus, the thesis addressed the following three research questions:
(1) Is the Middle East poorly integrated? (2) Do global factors determine inflation
in advanced economies? (3) What are the implications of Ukraine’s trade policy?
5.1 Summary
The Middle East and North Africa is a region often portrayed as economically poorly
integrated owing to a low intra-regional trade with relatively little economic policy
coordination efforts and a limited involvement to the world trading system (e.g.
Rouis and Tabor, 2013). However, with the steady mobility of human capital across
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regional borders is this conjecture correct? To address this question, Chapter 2
develops production equilibrium that arises in a fully integrated economic area char-
acterized by free trade, similar technologies and free mobility of human and physical
capital. It then applies metrics to measure the distance between a fully integrated
benchmark and the actual data. The metrics allow to compare the extent of eco-
nomic integration both over time and across different world regions. Chapter 2
applies these to three different regions - the Middle East, Latin America and the
European Union. Despite apparent differences present between the regions, we find
that their measures of economic integration are remarkably close in 2009. We argue
therefore that human capital mobility is an important instrument to achieve closer
economic integration and that its omission can strongly understate the extent of
actual economic integration within an economic area.
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of global factors in advanced economy inflation.
There has been an increasing interest both in academic and policy circles on the
extent to which advanced economy inflation can be considered to be a global phe-
nomenon (Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010, Borio and Filardo, 2007). To contribute to
the discussion, Chapter 3 estimates country-specific Phillips curves for 19 advanced
economies. The Phillips curves are augmented with global factors that include dif-
ferent measures of global economic slack, global inflation and commodity prices. We
find that except of commodity prices other global factors have limited role in shaping
domestic inflation developments. In particular, we find no direct effects of global
economic slack and global inflation on domestic inflation rates for the majority of
countries. Measures of global economic slack are rarely significant and their impor-
tance does not grow over time. With regard to the role of global inflation and in line
with existent literature we find that global inflation has been indeed a useful factor
in forecasting advanced economy inflation rates. However, we find that this role is
limited solely to 1970-80s when inflation rates have been high and volatile. Since
1990s global inflation does not add any improvement to domestic inflation forecasts
anymore. More specifically, inflation forecasting models that include measures of
global inflation do not perform better in terms of their root mean squared errors
than a simple autoregression. Our results also provide evidence suggesting that
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global inflation helps to forecast domestic inflation in 1970-80s because it happens
to capture well the slow-moving trends in inflation rates. Much the same role can be
performed by domestic long-term inflation expectations. This questions the useful-
ness of a global component to forecast domestic inflation rates. Thus, irrespective
of the variety of global measures considered, once we control for commodity prices
we find no direct effects of other global factors on domestic inflation. Commodity
prices and, to a more moderate extent, domestic economic slack remain the main
drivers of inflation in advanced economies.
Chapter 4 evaluates trade policy options of Ukraine. In 2014 the country opted
for closer economic cooperation with the European Union and signed a so called
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the latter. To evaluate possi-
ble implications of this policy choice Chapter 4 considers two scenarios. One looks
at the consequences for Ukraine from stronger economic ties with the European
Union, whereas another focuses on the consequences from stronger economic ties
with the Commonwealth of Independent States. We use a gravity model framework
and a world bilateral export data set to evaluate the two scenarios. Our data set
includes bilateral export flows between 159 economies over 1997 - 2012. We control
for a number of relevant free trade area and customs union agreements and we take
into account the effects of infrastructure and governance on trade. We use three
different estimation approaches that account for a large number of zeros in bilateral
trade data - Heckman two-stage procedure, Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and
Martin-Pham tobit - and we apply statistical tests to discriminate between alterna-
tive models. Our scenario analyses rely on the results of the best performing models.
We find persistently robust outcomes for a number of variables. First, we find that
CIS countries significantly overtrade with each other under the CIS agreement and
that the access of Ukraine to the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Rus-
sian Federation would not bring additional trade benefits. On the other hand, we
find no conclusive evidence on direct effects stemming from a free trade area agree-
ment with the EU. However, the results reveal several indirect effects of relevance to
Ukraine. Namely, closer ties with the EU would certainly facilitate the improvement
of Ukraine’s governance and infrastructure. The following could, ceteris paribus, lead
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to respective gains of order of 98% and 22% for Ukrainian exporters.
5.2 Directions for Further Research
Chapter 2 has shown that output and production factor shares in a fully integrated
area are characterized by the Zipf’s law. The formal derivation of the result, however,
assumed no correlation between shares neither across the types of shares nor across
countries. An extension could be to investigate the conditions under which Zipf’s
law still holds for correlated reflected geometric Brownian motions. It is known
that for a set of correlated reflected geometric Brownian motions there exists a
stationary distribution as long as the so called skew-symmetry condition is satisfied.
The question of whether the existing limiting distribution leads to the Zipf’s law may
be an interesting and important generalization of our findings in Chapter 2. Clearly,
the application of our integration measures can be extended to other world regions
(e.g., the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the members of
East Asean trade arrangements).
Chapter 3 has focused on the role of global factors in domestic headline inflation
developments. While the results point to no direct effects of global factors, indi-
rect channels may yet play a role. Given significant heterogeneity of the coefficients
across countries, a direction for future research could be to estimate country spe-
cific vector autoregressions to capture possible indirect effects. A promising channel
could be commodity prices that significantly affect headline inflation rates. Less so,
but nevertheless significant, could be a domestic slack channel. Another direction for
future research could be focusing on an even more extended variety of measures of
global economic slack. As in Borio and Filardo (2007) a yet another measure could
be country-varying and based on, for example, trade weights of the most important
trading partners. Alternatively, measures of global economic slack could be extended
to include non-OECD members and, in particular, China that takes an important
share of world output. In this case, however, the availability of accurate output gap
data, could be an issue. Further research could also be directed to look for regular-
ities in parameter time-variation. Though not for all, for some advanced economies
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like the United States, Australia and Canada the flattening of the Phillips curve
has been confirmed. Does this change in the coefficient occur due to global factors?
Models with time-varying coefficients may be a possible research methodology for
this group of advanced economies. It is also interesting to look at whether the effect
of global factors on domestic inflation depends on the list of countries included into
global measures. A hypothesis could be whether, e.g. neighbouring countries have
a larger weight in driving domestic inflation developments.
Chapter 4 has estimated the gravity model of trade using world bilateral export
flow data. The focus has been on Ukraine. However, the model is potentially
suitable for any world country. An extension to non-EU trade agreements could be
performed and the focus could be shifted to, for example, the Middle East or Latin
America. Further, although the models, that the analysis was built on, included
a wide range of fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, it could be
interesting to investigate the role of, for example, exchange rate, exchange rate
volatility or other possibly omitted trade determinants. This raises the question of
how various exchange rate arrangements affect trade, which, in turn, relates to a
large literature on the role of monetary unions in stimulating trade (see, e.g. Glick
and Rose, 2002). Additionally, we may seek for alternative ways governance affects
trade flows. In our models of Chapter 4 governance indicators entered directly either
linearly or log-linearly. Although it has lead to robust outcomes, a formal theoretical
derivation of how governance influences trade may deserve future research to further
strengthen our findings.

Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
De afgelopen jaren waren rijk aan gebeurtenissen in de internationale arena. De
wereld heeft toen de diepste recessie sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog ervaren. Het
langzame economisch herstel dat volgde en de langdurige fase van lage inflatie stelde
overheden en centrale banken van veel economieën in de wereld voor uitdagingen.
Eind 2010 kwam de Arabische lente naar het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika. De
onrust had belangrijke geopolitieke en economische gevolgen voor de regio. Het
raakte de regionale toerisme-industrie, verlaagde overdrachten naar werkenden en
creëerde onzekerheid bij zowel binnenlandse als buitenlandse investeerders. Vier
jaar later vond de Maidanrevolutie plaats in Oekraïne, wat resulteerde in de on-
dertekening van de zogenaamde Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agree-
ment tussen het land en de Europese Unie. Het handelsverdrag is op 1 januari 2016
in werking getreden. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de belangrijkste aspecten rondom
deze gebeurtenissen op empirische wijze.
Het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika is een regio die is vaak als economisch
slecht geïntegreerd wordt beschouwd. Dit komt door een laag niveau van intrare-
gionale handel met relatief weinig economische beleidscoördinatie, en een beperkte
betrokkenheid bij het wereldhandelssysteem (bijv.Rouis and Tabor, 2013). De vraag
is echter of deze veronderstelling juist is, gezien de gestage mobiliteit van menselijk
kapitaal over de regionale grenzen. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, ontwikkelt
Hoofdstuk 2 een productie-evenwicht dat ontstaat in een volledig geïntegreerd economisch
gebied met vrije handel, vergelijkbare technologieën en volledige mobiliteit van
menselijk en fysiek kapitaal. Het model gebruikt vervolgens de maten om de afs-
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tand tussen een volledig geïntegreerd evenwicht en de daadwerkelijke data te meten.
Het is mogelijk om met deze maten de mate van economische integratie te vergeli-
jken, zowel over de tijd als tussen verschillende regio’s in de wereld. In Hoofdstuk
2 worden de maten toegepast op drie verschillende regio’s - het Midden-Oosten,
Latijns-Amerika en de Europese Unie. Ondanks evidente verschillen die bestaan zijn
tussen deze regio’s, vinden we dat de maten van economische integratie opmerkelijk
overeenkomstig zijn in 2009. We stellen daarom dat de mobiliteit van menselijk
kapitaal een belangrijk instrument is om nauwere economische integratie te bewerk-
stelligen, en dat het weglaten van deze factor de werkelijke mate van economische
integratie binnen een economische ruimte sterk onderschat.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de rol van mondiale factoren ten aanzien van inflatie in
ontwikkelde economieën. Er is een toenemende belangstelling, zowel in academische
als in beleidskringen, voor de mate waarin inflatie in ontwikkelde economieën een
globaal fenomeen is (Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010; Borio and Filardo, 2007). Om aan
deze discussie bij te dragen, schat Hoofdstuk 3 land-specifieke Phillips curves voor
19 ontwikkelde economieën. De Phillips curves worden vermeerderd met mondiale
factoren met inbegrip van verschillende maten van de globale economische vertrag-
ing, globale inflatie en grondstofprijzen. We vinden dat, met uitzondering van de
grondstofprijzen, mondiale factoren een beperkte invloed hebben ten aanzien van
de ontwikkeling van binnenlandse inflatie. In het bijzonder vinden we in de meeste
landen geen directe effecten van globale economische vertraging en globale inflatie op
binnenlandse inflatie. De maten van globale economische vertraging zijn zelden sig-
nificant en het belang hiervan groeit niet over de tijd. Wat betreft de rol van globale
inflatie en in overeenstemming met bestaande literatuur is globale inflatie inderdaad
een nuttige factor voor het voorspellen van inflatie in ontwikkelde economieën. We
vinden echter dat deze rol zich uitsluitend beperkt tot de jaren ‘70 en ‘80, toen de
inflatie hoog en volatiel was. Sinds de jaren ‘90 draagt de globale inflatie niet meer
bij aan het verbeteren van de prognoses van de binnenlandse inflatie. Meer specifiek
doen de voorspellingsmodellen van inflatie die maten van globale inflatie bevatten
het niet beter in termen van hun gemiddelde kwadratische afwijkingen dan een sim-
pele autoregressie. Onze resultaten leveren ook bewijs dat suggereert dat de globale
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inflatie helpt om de binnenlandse inflatie in de jaren ‘70 en ‘80 te voorspellen, omdat
het de trage ontwikkeling van de inflatie goed vastlegt. Deze rol kan ook worden
vervuld door de binnenlandse inflatieverwachtingen op de lange termijn. Dit resul-
taat zet vraagtekens bij het nut van een globale component om de binnenlandse
inflatie te voorspellen. Dus ongeacht de verscheidenheid aan mondiale factoren die
we onderzochten, zodra we controleren voor grondstofprijzen vinden we geen directe
effecten van andere mondiale factoren op binnenlandse inflatie. Grondstofprijzen en,
in iets mindere mate, binnenlandse economische vertraging blijven de belangrijkste
verantwoordelijken voor inflatie in ontwikkelde economieën.
Hoofdstuk 4 evalueert de opties voor het handelsbeleid van Oekraïne. In 2014
koos het land voor nauwere economische samenwerking met de Europese Unie en
ondertekende daartoe een zogenaamde Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ment. Om de mogelijke gevolgen van deze beleidskeuze te evalueren, beschouwt
Hoofdstuk 4 twee scenario’s. Het eerste scenario kijkt naar de gevolgen voor Oekraïne
van sterkere economische banden met de Europese Unie, terwijl het tweede scenario
zich richt op de gevolgen van sterkere economische banden met het Gemenebest van
Onafhankelijke Staten. We gebruiken een gravity model raamwerk en een dataset
met wereldwijde bilaterale exportdata om de scenario’s te evalueren. De dataset be-
treft bilaterale exportstromen tussen 159 economieën in de periode 1997-2012. We
controleren voor een aantal relevante factoren zoals overeenkomsten over vrijhandel-
szones en douane-unies, en we houden rekening met de effecten van infrastructuur
en het bestuur op de handel. We gebruiken drie verschillende schattingsmetho-
den die rekening houden met het grote aantal nullen in bilaterale handelsdata -
de Heckman tweetrapsprocedure, de Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood, en de
Martin-Pham Tobit - en we passen statistische tests toe om de alternatieve mod-
ellen met elkaar te vergelijken. We baseren onze scenario-analyses op de resultaten
van de best presterende modellen. We vinden aanhoudend sterke resultaten voor een
aantal variabelen. Ten eerste vinden we dat de GOS-landen overmatig met elkaar
handelen op basis van de GOS-overeenkomst, en dat de toegang van Oekraïne tot
de douane-unie met Wit-Rusland, Kazachstan en de Russische Federatie geen extra
handelsvoordelen oplevert. Aan de andere kant vinden we geen sluitend bewijs dat er
directe effecten voortvloeien uit de vrijheidszone met de EU. De resultaten onthullen
echter verschillende indirecte effecten die relevant zijn voor Oekraïne, namelijk dat
hechtere banden met de EU bijdragen aan het verbeteren van het bestuur en de
infrastructuur van Oekraïne. Dat kan, ceteris paribus, leiden tot een toename van
orders van respectievelijk 98% en 22% voor Oekraïense exporteurs.
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